Contribution
My Lords, Amendments 77 to 79 propose to limit applications for judicial reviews that are without merit. It is proposed that they may be blocked by a judgment of the High Court. The amendments were tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, and me. In the likely absence of the noble Lord, I have undertaken to speak in support of them.
On Monday, the first day on Report, I spoke to Amendment 83, which describes a means of circumventing lengthy and costly judicial reviews that can affect infrastructure projects of national significance by giving the associated development consent orders—DCOs—the status of Acts of Parliament, which would be legally incontestable. There was no intention in that amendment to curtail meaningful processes of scrutiny and consultation. The purpose was to protect projects from costly and dilatory legal reviews initiated by tendentious factions that are liable to promote their own interests at the expense of those of the wider community or the national interest.
In recent years, the planning system has become increasingly sclerotic. The average time it takes to obtain planning permission for major infrastructure projects has more than doubled in the last decade to more than four years. A judicial review with a minor or frivolous justification may occasion a resubmission of an application for a development order. The revised application might become subject, in turn, to a further judicial review. Despite the eventual dismissal of these appeals, the legal processes can be so costly and cause such delays that the infrastructure project goes into abeyance. Then the contestants have effectively won their case, despite its lack of legal merit.
I should say that I am not averse in principle to judicial reviews. Many of them do have merit. However, a very large and increasing number of requests for judicial reviews are rising nowadays, and hearings are granted in 75% of the cases. They form a lengthy queue and pre-empt the legal resources.
The fashion for judicial views may have been greatly stimulated by the experience of the Archway Road protests, which took place over a period of 20 years from the early 1970s to the 1990s. These protests were prompted by a proposal to develop a motorway dual carriageway in Archway, where the A1 trunk road effectively begins. It was said the purpose of the scheme was to expedite the escape from the centre of London of politicians, senior civil servants and a body of secretaries in the case of the threat of a nuclear missile strike. They were to be conveyed to a secret nuclear bunker in Kelvedon Hatch in Essex, where they might continue to govern the country, while the rest of us perished. It was said that they might have the task of regenerating the population that had been obliterated.
The road scheme would have destroyed 170 houses, for the loss of which the residents would have been given very meagre compensation. It was said that they would have been given no more compensation than would have enabled them to purchase a one-bedroom flat in Tottenham Marshes. A question has to be asked about whether compensation tends nowadays to be more generous. Does its inadequacy continue to provide an incentive to resist infrastructure developments and to resort to judicial procedures to block them? This unpopular scheme has had a long legacy. It established a precedent for judicial reviews that has been followed ever since, for good and for bad reasons.
Amendment 83 did not receive favour from the Government, and in withdrawing it I was clear that I was somewhat disappointed by their response, because we are facing a crisis caused by the wilful delay and obstruction of virtually every important infrastructure project. There is nothing in the Bill or forthcoming from the Government that will address the crisis adequately. We are left with nothing more than the present group of amendments which propose that, in various circumstances pertaining to the Town and Country Planning Act, the listed buildings and conservation Act and the hazardous substances Act, the High Court may deem an appeal to be unworthy of further consideration. I believe that the Court of Appeal already has this prerogative, so there may be very little substance in these amendments, but nevertheless they serve to highlight the problem.