Baroness Finn (Con)

My Lords, these amendments are tabled in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Younger of Leckie. I am also grateful for the support of the noble Lord, Lord Vaux of Harrowden. The amendments concern the crucial questions of ministerial and parliamentary oversight of the extensive investigatory and enforcement powers granted under the Bill. The Bill sets out to create a powerful investigatory body with wide authority, but the lines of accountability are unclear. The first of my amendments roots the exercise of the powers provided for in this part of the Bill firmly within the framework of the Act itself. It makes it clear that investigatory and enforcement powers under Clauses 3, 7, 17 and 38—covering information notices, entry and seizure powers, direct deduction orders and deduction from earnings orders—may not be exercised except as expressly provided for in this clause. This is a vital safeguard. It ensures that these powers cannot be used arbitrarily or for purposes beyond those envisaged by Parliament. In essence, it ties the use of such powers to the functions and objectives clearly defined elsewhere in the Bill, preventing mission creep, ensuring accountability and anchoring their use in clear statutory purpose. The second amendment, which is closely related, builds on that principle of restraint by setting out a clear system of authorisation, accountability and record-keeping. It would require that the most serious powers—those involving access to personal financial information, entry and search of premises, or the recovery of large sums of money—can be exercised only with explicit ministerial approval. This is not just bureaucracy; it is responsibility. It makes Ministers answerable for the exercise of powers in their name. Other powers of a lesser nature would require sign-off at senior Civil Service level or above, ensuring that every exercise of authority is subject to appropriate scrutiny and senior oversight. In addition, the PSFA would be required to maintain a register recording each use of these powers—the date and nature of the action, the official or Minister who authorised it, and the justification for doing so. That register would then be laid before Parliament annually. If we are to give such considerable powers to civil servants acting on behalf of Ministers, we must be absolutely certain that there are clear lines of responsibility and clear records of decision-making. Without those, we risk creating a dangerous vacuum of accountability. Let us be clear: the significant new powers which the Bill grants to officials are not to be taken lightly. They go to the heart of personal privacy, financial autonomy and, potentially, due process. Under this amendment, certain especially intrusive powers, such as requiring the disclosure of personal financial records, applying for search and seizure warrants or imposing deduction orders of over £10,000, would require explicit approval from a Minister of the Crown. This would ensure that decisions with the potential to impact individuals’ lives in a profound way are not taken in isolation by junior officials, because if something goes wrong or those powers are misused or abused, it will not be the officials who are hauled before Select Committees or public inquiries—it is the Minister for the Cabinet Office who will be called upon to account for actions taken in his or her name, of which they may have had absolutely no knowledge. It is therefore vital that the Minister is satisfied that the action is justified and is willing to stand behind that decision if challenged. This line of accountability is crucial for proper oversight; it also protects the Minister. We have seen through painful and enduring examples such as the Horizon scandal what happens when the chain of accountability between operational decision-makers and Ministers is allowed to break down. Victims are left without recourse, officials retreat into anonymity and Ministers are left to apologise for decisions they did not make and could not have prevented. We should learn from that experience. We should ensure that the exercise of coercive state powers, particularly powers as sensitive as these, is traceable, reviewable and ultimately answerable to Parliament. These amendments were well received and supported by noble Lords across the House in Committee. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, for adding his name, and other noble Lords who supported these proposals. These amendments protect the Minister, the department and individuals who may be subject to these powers. They ensure that no power is used without proper authorisation, that every use is recorded, and that Parliament can see each year how these powers have been exercised and by whom. We support the Government’s ambition to tackle fraud and error in the public sector, but we must always remember that power without responsibility breeds mistrust. This is not an abstract constitutional point. It is a matter of basic fairness, good governance and trust in public administration. For those reasons, this amendment is of vital importance. It provides the clear lines of authority and accountability that must underpin any responsible use of the significant powers in the Bill. The Government may say that safeguards already exist, but those safeguards are internal, opaque and unenforceable by Parliament. We are proposing a statutory framework for oversight that gives Ministers clarity, Parliament visibility and the public reassurance that power is being exercised carefully, lawfully and transparently. This amendment is not about obstructing the Government’s aims; it is about protecting them and protecting the integrity of the system we are building. I beg to move.