Lord Wilson of Sedgefield (Lab)

I thank the noble Viscount for Amendment 23, which builds on a previous amendment tabled in Committee. It proposes a process for projects designated by the Secretary of State as “critical national priority”, where development consent orders would come into force only once approved through an Act of Parliament. This amendment seeks to bypass judicial review and insulate these projects from challenge and thereby speed up the building of infrastructure. Although the provision does not directly alter the judicial review process itself, it uses parliamentary process to significantly reduce the public’s ability to challenge government decisions on these types of critical projects. This amendment proposes a mechanism for the Secretary of State to designate certain classes of development as “critical national priority”, based on identification in a relevant national policy statement. It is important to remind the House that this status already exists and is actively applied—for example, to renewable and low-carbon energy projects through the energy NPS, to strengthen the need case for such infrastructure. However, this amendment seeks to go much further. I cannot support it for a number of key reasons. First, the proposed ouster in new Section 118(1A) would shield decisions from judicial review even where they were unlawful. For this reason, it is an approach which the courts have historically resisted. Given that this would be applied to some of the biggest and most controversial schemes, it is likely that challenges would be lodged in respect of the confirmed DCO, thereby undermining the time savings sought in the first place. Secondly, the amendment would result in a constitutional confrontation between Parliament and the courts. This may result in questioning of well understood constitutional conventions, inviting further legal uncertainty. Finally, there are serious practical impediments to the amendment. It would introduce a new, truncated parliamentary procedure for applicants to undertake after having completed the DCO process. It risks creating confusion and slowing the delivery of our most important projects by layering parliamentary procedures on top of an already rigorous regime. That adds more work and uncertainty for applicants—particularly detrimental for our largest projects—at a time when clarity and efficiency are essential. We recognise that the amendment is driven by valid concerns that lengthy legal challenges delay projects and add costs. However, the right approach to tackling this problem is by still enabling legal challenges but supporting the courts to handle them efficiently. Further to our commitment to implement the Banner review and limit the ability for meritless cases to return to the courts, the Government recently decided to go further. On 15 October, they announced their intention to work with the judiciary to implement further procedural changes to ensure that NSIP cases are dealt with more quickly and consistently. The changes include introducing clear target timescales for NSIP cases in the High Court, aiming for a substantive hearing within four months of the application. We are also making it clear that NSIP cases in the Court of Appeal should be handled by judges with appropriate planning experience. Together with the recent reforms, these further procedural changes will help make the judicial review process for major projects quicker, clearer and more predictable. I am grateful to my noble friend for tabling this amendment and for the thoughtful debate that it has prompted.