The Earl of Lytton (CB)

My Lords, I very much welcome the opportunity to discuss the matters in this Bill and welcome the noble Baroness, Lady Levitt, to the Front Bench. She is obviously used to dealing with gargantuan matters, such as those to do with my profession and the RICS, in her previous capacity, and I wish her well in her endeavours in chewing through this 400-page Bill. My first point relates to anti-social behaviour. In my experience of inter-neighbour matters, the distinction between perpetrator and victim is seldom absolute—a point made by my noble friend Lord Russell of Liverpool. When I encounter instances of an ASB order made in such terms that normal life is actually impeded—and then the so-called victim proceeds to indulge in exactly the same sort of behaviour that has been prevented for his neighbour—I know that something is not right. There needs to be a better balance and there need to be order-making powers, and enforcement ought to be subject to better rules, competence and oversight. My second point relates to Clauses 72, 79 and 80, principally regarding the duty to report suspected sex abuse of children. I fully support that duty, particularly in so far as it is applied to the persons listed as being under the duty to report. It should have consequences for those who culpably fail to report or who obstruct that duty. This follows the prima facie principle that victims should be heard and believed and that a report of a matter involving a commission of a crime, as defined by law, should be so recorded unless there is credible evidence to the contrary, particularly in the context of young people. Once on a record in the system, the matter then demands attention and conscious process, including, one hopes, some support to the victim. That is until such time as additional verifiable information dictates otherwise. Outside that recording system, there is nothing—no practical form of subsidiary watch-list or anything like that—so spotting a trend, pattern or commonality in the data, outside a formal record, seems to me to depend on chance recognition by an official. So far so good, but then Clause 80 proceeds to start unravelling things by effectively deferring to the balance-of-probabilities, evidence-based approach inherent in police procedures and Home Office counting rules. I believe this is incompatible with the intent and aim of Clauses 72 and 79. Suspicions, which is what we are talking about reporting, almost inevitably lack hard evidence. If, say, the recording officer of police does not happen to be satisfied as to the evidence, and therefore does not believe it can be reliably stated to be a crime that has been committed on his or her balance of probabilities test—as suggested in guidance or as directed by the senior officer—it may not get recorded. Not only does this court perversity, because recorded crime is related to police performance, but it risks repetition of precisely the outcomes of the Bradford child sexual exploitation case, when vulnerable young people were not believed and criminal enterprise went unchecked. In my view, Clause 80 requires a rethink or simply deleting. I note that this may have wider implications for the way in which crime is recorded and acted upon. My final point relates to Part 9. Other noble Lords have made impassioned comments, so I am not alone in sensing that there is a degree of tendency to administrative overreach—even a politically thin-skinned reaction at times—in the cumulative measures eroding the right to demonstrate. I very much relate to the comments of the noble Baronesses, Lady Miller of Chilthorne Domer and Lady Cash, and I hope that, between us, we can get a better balance of what we actually mean by allowing people the necessary freedom and opportunity to vent their emotions and campaign and demonstrate safely.