Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)

I am grateful to all noble Lords who have raised points in this Second Reading. I thank the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, and the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, for their support from His Majesty’s loyal Opposition. I also welcome the broad support from the noble Lords, Lord Anderson and Lord Carlile. I recognise that other noble Lords have made legitimate points, and I will try to respond to them. I remind the House that the debate is about the very small amendment to the legislation. It is not about the principle or application of deprivation, or the numbers of people who have had their citizenship deprived. It is a response to the Supreme Court judgment and what that means in relation to individuals who could potentially return to or retain their status in the United Kingdom when the Government have, through the Home Secretary, determined, for whatever reason, that that individual needs to have their citizenship deprived. That is a very serious step for a Home Secretary to take. When the Supreme Court states, as it did in the recent case, that an individual can retain their citizenship during the appeal process, that means that the individual, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, just mentioned, will be free to remain a British citizen, with all the rights and privileges that brings, while the appeal is ongoing, unless this legislation is put in place. The noble Lord, Lord German, in his introductory remarks, made a number of points about that. Essentially, I ask him whether he is willing to take the risk. That is the nub of the argument that we are putting to the House today—that the purpose of deprivation of citizenship being maintained during the course of the appeal procedure is so that the United Kingdom Government, the Home Secretary, accountable to the House of Commons, and me in this House, accountable for the Home Office, can take a decision and uphold it during the period of appeal. If the appeal is successful downstream then all bets are off and the individual’s citizenship is restored. For whatever reason it was originally removed, the Home Secretary’s decision has been overturned and the status quo for the individual remains. However, in the event of the individual remaining at the serious risk level that meant the Home Secretary brought forward the citizenship issue in the first place, that opens the United Kingdom to a risk until such time as the appeal is heard. This Bill deals solely with that issue. I heard what the noble Baroness, Lady D’Souza, and the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, said on this matter, but I put it to them and to the noble Lord, Lord German that the issue is about the management of risk by the UK Government in a limited circumstance, which I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, for raising. This has been a fair debate about what we call the “Kit Malthouse amendments”, as a number of noble Lords have raised in their contributions. It is not appropriate to confer this discretion on the courts, because it is the Secretary of State who is accountable to this House and to Parliament, through the House of Commons, for matters of national security. As the noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew, mentioned, deprivation of citizenship and national security are matters for the Home Secretary. The Supreme Court itself emphasised that in its discussion and judgment. The Bill will align the approach to asylum and human rights appeals and extend it to appeals to the Supreme Court. Decisions to deprive are taken in accordance with our international obligations and with consideration as to whether to give deprivation will expose the person to a real risk of mistreatment, which would constitute a breach of Articles 2 or 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The Home Secretary is the person responsible for that decision. I hear what noble Lords have said but that is the reason why my noble friend in the Commons, Minister Jarvis, rejected the Kit Malthouse approach, and the reason why I do so today. Valid points have been raised. The noble Lords, Lord Jay, Lord German, Lord Anderson and Lord Verdirame, mentioned citizenship and the impact on the child. I pay great tribute to the private discussions —which are now public discussions because we have talked about them—that I had with the noble Lord, Lord Jay, because they raised an important issue. We have looked at that and reflected on it, and I hope I can give a satisfactory response to all noble Lords who have raised this question with me. It is simply this: the Bill does not alter the existing situation in relation to children born to deprived individuals, which is already established in law. Where a child holds British citizenship, the deprivation of the parent’s citizenship has no effect on the child’s nationality status. Again, those points were mentioned across the House today. In cases where a child is born after the parent was deprived of British citizenship—another issue that the noble Lord, Lord Jay, has mentioned privately and in the Chamber today—their entitlement to British citizenship will depend on a number of factors, including the status of the other parent. The consequence of the Supreme Court’s decision in N3(ZA) is that if the child would have been British had their parent not been deprived then a successful appeal against deprivation by their parent means the child is automatically a British citizen. There are no changes in any of the principles that we have here, and I hope that reassures noble Lords on these points. Again, I am happy to reflect on that in due course. The noble Lord, Lord Jay, made valid points on the question of the appeals procedure and the fast-track process that takes place. In answer to what I think was his pointed question to me, the Government are committed to supporting the expediting of these cases on a case-by-case basis, where appropriate, as quickly as possible. It is in no one’s interests to have long drawn-out appeals. What is the practical implication of that in relation to the courts determining the length of the appeal procedure where disagreements arise, now that courts have the power to order case management reviews to resolve issues? The current rules of court already permit the court to make directions to expedite cases if there are reasons for that to be done. The judiciary themselves are probably, dare I say it, better placed than the Home Secretary to determine and assess in each case how they can expedite those cases or not. All the factors that the noble Lord, Lord Jay, is concerned about are things that would potentially mean that a judge could determine, with “defence counsel”, that this needs to be done quickly. That is reasonable, and we want to see it over and done with as quickly as possible. We can look at the practical implications for the Government, but I hope I can reassure him on the principle. Questions were asked about whether a person could be deported from the UK while they are appealing against the deprivation decision. In theory, it is possible for a person to be deprived of citizenship and deported before the deprivation appeal is resolved, but in practice that is going to be difficult because there will be the opportunity for people to make a human rights claim in response to the stage 1 deportation letter, and that means they would have an in-country right of appeal against the refusal of that claim if certified and a right of redress against the certification decision. It is a matter for the courts how those appeals are managed. A number of other points were raised, including by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, about the role of the terrorism reviewer having oversight of these matters. The current situation is that the oversight for this aspect of public policy lies with the inspector of borders. They can determine their own inspection regime, if they wish to look at that. The terrorism reviewer does not currently have that role and responsibility—that is an argument the noble Lord might want to put down for debate. Should the inspector of borders wish to have an investigation on the performance of any matter to do with this—including the rights of the child, the length of the appeal procedure or the Home Secretary’s powers—they could do that, should they so wish, independently of government. So there is a sort of oversight there, but maybe not to the standard or type that the noble Lord wishes. Ultimately, for this House—and, again, I am grateful for the support of His Majesty’s Opposition, in particular on this—it boils down to whether we are willing to take the risk. If the Home Secretary has taken advice from officials at a senior level and signed that order and taken the decision to deprive an individual of their citizenship, they have done that because there is a threat to the United Kingdom, in one form or another. If this Bill is not enacted, that threat will potentially materialise in another form as the individual will be able to restore their rights as a citizen when they appeal the original decision. This is the purpose of this Bill. I recognise the range of points made by noble Lords from across the House on a range of issues, from the principle of deprivation in the first place to the numbers and so on, but that is the focus of the Bill and I put the question: are noble Lords willing to take that risk? I suggest that the Government are not and I am grateful to those Members who will support that position in this House today.