Viscount Hailsham (Con)

My Lords, in the circumstances I shall confine my observations to Amendments 422A and 422B. Before I do so, I say that I strongly support the amendment just moved by the noble Baroness. Were she to divide the House on it, I would support it, but I gather that, perhaps because of the press of business, that is not her present intention. The purpose of Amendment 422A is to ensure that individuals can be prosecuted under Sections 12 and 13 of the Terrorism Act for the offence of supporting an act of terrorism only if the alleged acts amount to supporting terrorism in the sense that the ordinary citizen would understand that concept. Amendment 422A makes explicit that the necessary intent that the prosecution must prove is that the alleged acts were done with the intent of encouraging, inciting, facilitating or enabling another to commit an act of terrorism. The amendment also restricts the possibility of a demonstrator being arrested under the provisions of Sections 12 and 13 of the Act. In general, an arrest must be authorised by a senior police officer of the rank of superintendent or above. My suggestion to your Lordships is that the present situation is wholly unsatisfactory. It has been widely criticised, for example, by the judges in the Palestine Action case. In that case, judicial concern about statutory overreach contributed to the proscription of Palestine Action being held to be unlawful. It has also been the subject of much distinguished criticism—for example by Lord Sumption, a former member of the Supreme Court. I suggest that the position is profoundly unjust. If we consider, for example, the demonstrations that have been taking place in the streets of London, hundreds of people have been holding up placards that say, “I support Palestine Action”. Many of these characters are elderly and retired folk, rather like me; most self-evidently respectable, rather like me; and usually without knowledge of the secret workings of Palestine Action, rather like me. Now they may be self-indulgent—rather like me—and some accuse them of being naive, but are they really guilty of terrorism in the sense that most of us understand that concept? I suggest, surely not. What they are doing is using a form of shorthand to demonstrate their opposition to the policies of Israel in Gaza and the West Bank, and that they are entitled to do. There are at least three serious objections to the present law. First, it is a serious restriction on free speech. I refer here not to the European convention, although it may be engaged, but to the long-standing tradition of English law. Secondly, to use the law in circumstances that offend the common sense of the ordinary citizen brings the whole body of criminal law into disrepute.