Dan Jarvis

This morning, the Crown Prosecution Service decided not to proceed with the prosecution of Christopher Cash and Christopher Berry, who had been charged with espionage for China under the Official Secrets Act 1911. Members right across the House will be aware that the charges related to allegations of Chinese espionage within Parliament and will want reassurance, as will you, Mr Speaker. Many Members will be as extremely disappointed as I am that there will now not be a trial. The decision not to proceed with this prosecution is an independent one for the CPS to make in its role as the UK’s independent prosecuting authority. However, I want to be clear that the Government remain gravely concerned about the threat of Chinese espionage. Parliament and our democracy are sacrosanct, and any attempt by any foreign power to infiltrate or interfere with parliamentary proceedings is completely unacceptable. With your permission, Mr Speaker, I will therefore set out the measures the Government are taking to tackle any residual risks arising from this case and outline the wider approach the Government are taking to protecting our democracy and countering state threats, including those from China. The decision of the CPS related to charges under the Official Secrets Act 1911, which was the relevant legislation in force at the time. It is well known that state threats legislation had not kept pace with the changing threats we face. The Official Secrets Act was passed to counter the threat from German spies before the first world war. It referred to espionage as obtaining “any sketch, plan, model, article, note, document, or information” that “might be…useful to an enemy”. Clearly, that language—drafted well over 100 years ago —does not reflect the types of espionage or state threats we face in the modern day, nor the breadth of states that engage directly in that activity. For that reason, the UK passed and has now commenced the National Security Act 2023 with cross-party support. That legislation, which replaced the Official Secrets Act 1911, brings new criminal offences and powers to bear against the full range of modern-day state threats. Moreover, the National Security Act is state agnostic, removing the unhelpful “enemy” language from the Official Secrets Act and focusing on the malign activity we are all concerned about. The Act also introduced the foreign influence registration scheme, which the Government brought into force on 1 July. FIRS encourages transparency, strengthening the resilience of our democratic institutions against covert influence, and gives our intelligence agencies and law enforcement additional tools to detect, deter, disrupt and prosecute state threat actors. It requires that any foreign influence in our democracy, including from China, be declared. We can now be confident that should cases of espionage or state threats be uncovered in the future, we will be in a much better position to prosecute them under the new National Security Act. This case hits at the heart of our democracy, so let me be clear: the Government will not tolerate any state threats to the UK and its democratic institutions. We will robustly challenge China when necessary, as we would challenge any country for unacceptable behaviour on our soil. I can confirm that the Foreign Office has démarched the chargé d’affaires of the Chinese embassy in London to make clear that we will not tolerate any activity that interferes in our democracy. MI5 is considering the provision of additional advice to those most at risk of being targeted by state-led espionage, and the Government are taking robust action to counter state threats and continue to build up the UK’s resilience. In April, we established a new cross-Government state threats unit to better co-ordinate our response to state threats. As I set out following the recently completed review of transnational repression, new training modules on identifying and countering state threats are being offered to all 45 territorial police forces through the College of Policing and are mandatory for counter-terrorism policing officers. We have committed to legislate as soon as parliamentary time allows to take forward the recommendations of Jonathan Hall KC, the independent reviewer of terrorism and state threats legislation. That includes creating a new proscription-style tool for state threats. As the former Foreign Secretary, my right hon. Friend the Member for Tottenham (Mr Lammy) set out in his statement to the House following the conclusion of the China audit, we are investing £600 million in our intelligence services to support them in detecting and disrupting state threats to the UK. In September, the National Cyber Security Centre co-sealed a US-led technical advisory calling out Chinese state-sponsored cyber-threat actors targeting global networks, including in the UK. I know there will be calls to go further, and I reassure the House and the country that we will keep all tools under review and act as necessary. As you are aware, Mr Speaker, the safety and security of our Parliament is of the utmost importance. That is why the National Protective Security Authority will issue new protective security guidance to parliamentarians and political staff on protection against foreign interference and espionage. That guidance outlines the potential risks we all may face in our day-to-day work, and how we can all better protect ourselves. I urge colleagues to read and follow the advice once issued. I also urge Members to take up the National Cyber Security Centre’s important opt-in service for Members of both Houses. It allows the NCSC to alert individuals if it identifies evidence of malicious activity on their personal devices or accounts, and swiftly advise them on steps to take to protect their information. The strategic defence review was clear that China presents a sophisticated and persistent challenge. As the national security strategy reinforced, instances of China’s espionage, interference in our democracy and undermining of our economic security have increased in recent years. As I have set out, we are addressing those threats, but there are also opportunities we need to grasp as we navigate our complex relationship with China. The last Government did not describe China as an enemy, and this Government do not think our relationship can be simplified down to a single word. Instead, we are taking a consistent, long-term approach to China, firmly rooted in the UK’s global interests. I finish by paying tribute to our law enforcement, security and intelligence agencies, who do so much to keep us all safe. They operate often in secret, often in the shadows and often at great personal danger, but they have our enduring gratitude. While we are extremely disappointed with the outcome in this case, the legislation it relied on has already been changed. Should we need to go further, we will not hesitate to do what is necessary to keep our country safe. I commend this statement to the House.