Contribution
Let me start by thanking the Security Minister for the briefing and information he provided ahead of his statement. Let me also join him in paying tribute to the officers in our police force and in the security service. They work so hard and take personal risks to keep us safe.
Let us start with Parliament’s Intelligence and Security Committee’s assessment of China, published a year or two ago. It found that China had penetrated every sector of our economy. When the Security Minister a moment ago said that China merely posed a “challenge”, he was wrong I think to use that word. China poses a threat. It poses a threat because it participates and organises systemic espionage into our public institutions, including Parliament. It purloins intellectual property from universities and from companies, particularly in the technology sectors, and it routinely spies on the UK as a state. They also engage in transnational repression of Chinese citizens here, for instance running secret, undeclared police stations and putting bounties on the heads of individuals. The word “challenge” is not strong enough; the state of China poses a threat.
The Security Minister said that the Government would “robustly challenge China”, but let me gently point to some of the decisions that the Government have taken in practice. We saw a signal back at the G7 last year, when the Prime Minister was, I am afraid to say, obsequious in dealing with President Xi, appearing to prioritise economic links above security considerations. We have not seen any decision to place China in the enhanced tier of the FIRS scheme, although that regime has been in place for several months, and the Government seem to be viewing with favour the application for a new super-embassy in London, to which our allies, including America, are urging us not to consent and which many of our intelligence services say will be used as a base for espionage activities. So the Government’s record on China causes deep concern, but of equal concern is this specific case—and, Mr Speaker, you explained why that is of particular concern to Parliament, given that the alleged espionage activities touch directly on Parliament and the way in which Members of Parliament do their duty.
I have in front of me a briefing provided to the press by the Crown Prosecution Service, dated 26 April 2024, when these charges were first laid. That briefing states that one of the subjects was commissioned over a period exceeding a year, between December 2021 and February 2023, by a Chinese intelligence asset. There are 34 reports on what this note describes as “very specific topics”, some of which relate directly and personally to Members of Parliament. One of the deputy national security advisers told the Crown Prosecution Service that he assessed this information to be “directly or indirectly, useful” to the Chinese state, and said that it was
“prejudicial to the safety or interests of the United Kingdom.”
Given the gravity of that assessment, it is astonishing that these charges have now been withdrawn. The Crown Prosecution Service clearly assessed these allegations, and the evidence, against the law—against the 1911 Act —in 2024, and found the test to have been met; so why today, more than a year later, have we suddenly been told that the test is no longer met? My question to the Security Minister is a simple one: given the gravity of the charges that I have just read out, what has changed between last year and this year? Why has a case that met the threshold and met the test in April 2024 all of a sudden been determined not to do so?
May I ask specifically whether anyone in the Government put any pressure on the Crown Prosecution Service in relation to this case? Did the Government co-operate fully with the police, the security services and the CPS in providing the information required, including information relating to the definition of “an enemy”? Can the Security Minister give the House those express assurances? I certainly share your concern, Mr Speaker, and, I am sure, the concern of many others, that what appears to be extremely serious espionage, assessed as such in the written disclosure that I read out—assessed by the deputy national security adviser as being prejudicial to our national interests—has all of a sudden, and with no explanation, been dropped, even though previously, just a year and a bit ago, it was assessed that this case did meet the threshold. The House and the country need to know what exactly has changed.