Baroness Falkner of Margravine (CB)

My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 422E and, additionally, do so on behalf of the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, KC, who has a prior appointment in The Hague this week. He was the author of the probing amendment on this topic in Committee. At that stage, the Minister signalled some reservations about it and subsequently wrote to him with additional data, which has proved to be most helpful, so we thank her. The noble Baroness, Lady Wolf of Dulwich, has appended her name to this amendment and will speak to it, along with her other amendment. Noble Lords will be aware that Clause 208, which was inserted into this Bill in the other place at a late stage, has attracted numerous amendments. Our intention with Amendment 422E is that, where opinions are a matter of individual conscience, we should attempt to offer the House a compromise between the Commons position—Clause 208—and Amendment 424, which seeks to leave out the clause entirely. I point out that Amendments 423, 423ZA and 423A would be pre-empted if this amendment was agreed on Division. The amendment would do two things. First, it would require the personal consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions before any proceedings may be instituted against women acting in relation to their pregnancy. Secondly, it would provide that such proceedings must be commenced within 12 months of the alleged offence. The version we debated in Committee provided for the consent of the Attorney-General rather than the Director of Public Prosecutions. The Minister observed that offences where Attorney-General consent is required tend to be in the national security or international spheres, while DPP consent is required to address a wider range of concerns, including, as the Minister explained, where there is a risk that the institution of proceedings might violate convention rights or cause a defendant “irreparable harm”. There are some offences in areas other than national security or international matters where AG consent is required, as the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, argues—for example, contempt of court under the strict liability rule, pursuant to Section 7 of the Contempt of Court Act. Nevertheless, on balance, it seems proportionate and in keeping with existing practice to replace Attorney-General consent with the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions. Our amendment would, however, require that the DPP exercises the function of giving consent “personally”. That language is taken from the Bribery Act, where some offences impose a similar condition on the DPP. Without this additional requirement, we understand that the consent of the DPP to institute proceedings could be given by a Crown prosecutor by virtue of Section 1(7) of the Prosecution of Offences Act 1985. So requiring the DPP to exercise that function personally provides, in our view, a better guarantee against the risk of abuse, error or overzealousness.