Lord Grabiner (CB)

My Lords, I will address two points. When you read the debates in the other place, you immediately see a strong focus by proponents of the Bill on the pain and suffering of the terminally ill individual in the period leading to death. That distress and suffering also impacts the lives of the family and friends of the individual. This point has been made by other noble Lords and was pressed by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, in his opening remarks. The curiosity is that, when we examine the conditions or safeguards designed to ensure, so far as possible, the integrity of the process devised for ending a life prematurely, there is a striking omission from the drafting. Specifically, no condition has been inserted to the effect that the patient should, still less must, be suffering pain or anguish of the kind that has been emphasised. This looks like a mismatch or non-sequitur. It is a convenient and emotionally appealing argument for those who propound this dramatic change in our law to stress the suffering of the patient. We all hate the idea of our nearest and dearest having to live with excruciating pain, but for some reason the Bill does not make the existence of that pain one of the conditions that needs to be satisfied before assisted death would be legally permissible. Perhaps the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, will be able to enlighten the House with an explanation for the non-sequitur. Alternatively, he may support a suitable amendment to deal with the point. We shall hear his view when he winds up. I think that the noble Lord, Lord Lamont, made a similar point a little earlier. The other point I want to draw attention to is that the conditions identified in the Bill are quite inadequate to cope with coercion—by which I mean family or social pressure put on the patient, which impacts or undermines what should genuinely be the free choice of the patient. Where money is involved, people have been known to misbehave and to do so badly. The noble Lord, Lord Dobbs, took a different view, with which I profoundly disagree. The point is neatly, if rather crudely, captured by the expression, “Where there’s a will, there’s a relative”. Google attributes this remark to the comedian, Ricky Gervais, but it is a serious point. At first blush, the proposed safeguard is the requirement for an opinion of the attending doctor, plus that of an additional independent doctor, supported by a panel which includes a lawyer—why lawyers are said to have any special capacity I do not begin to understand. I ask: what does any of this mean in practice? I am afraid that years as a lawyer may have made me a bit cynical. In particular, the reference to the involvement of the panel, including a lawyer, looks like a piece of window dressing. If two reputable doctors are in agreement, it is impossible to see what useful function the panel can perform. The panel cannot gainsay the joint view of the medical practitioners; they are the experts. By parity of reasoning, it is obvious that if the two doctors have not agreed, the case will never get to the panel. Unsurprisingly, it is not suggested that the panel should have the power to summon witnesses or to satisfy themselves whether the patient has been coerced or encouraged in the direction of suicide. I would add that coercion can be a thing of great subtlety. Even in court, where the validity of a will is debated, with all the panoply of documentary disclosure, witness statements and cross-examination, the truth may never emerge. None of these courtroom safeguards are contemplated by the Bill. The reference to the requirement for a panel to approve the Bill is just a fig leaf calculated to cover the doubters; on analysis, it provides no comfort. The safeguards in the Bill with respect to coercion are inadequate and I am not convinced that they can be satisfactorily improved.