Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)

I am tempted to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, by saying that I hope to keep the clause in and I have signed a compatibility with the Human Rights Act agreement, but I suspect that the noble Lord, Lord Carter of Haslemere, will want me to say something more than that. I will try to answer as best I can the points raised by the three noble Lords who have spoken in the debate. I have met them and written to them. In Committee, I explained the Government’s view and I have tried to assure them that the Government’s view is compatible with the points that they have raised, but I shall repeat those points today and, if the noble Lord is not satisfied, he can make his judgment accordingly. In Committee, noble Lords raised concerns and I have had discussions since then. Clause 212 concerns what happens when a UK court has already found that the requested person did not deliberately absent themselves from trial in the requesting state. In those circumstances, the clause ensures that extradition can proceed where a person has the right to retrial subject to the domestic court finding that they did not deliberately absent themselves, rather than requiring the requesting state to provide an unconditional right of retrial in every case. I say to all three noble Lords that this will not change UK courts still requiring the requesting state to show that there are legally prescribed and non-discretionary rights to retrial available to the requested person. As in the cases that have been raised in Committee and this evening—including the case of a constituent of mine, Mr Wright, when I was a Member of Parliament—it will remain the situation that, if the requesting state has already at the time of the UK extradition proceedings determined that the appeal rights are in effect exhausted, the requested person should be discharged. I also say to the noble Lord, Lord Carter of Haslemere, that the Government take their responsibilities towards the requested person extremely seriously. UK courts have robust powers under the Extradition Act 2003 to scrutinise and refuse any request that is incompatible with the right to a fair trial. If there are concerns in a specific case that the requested person is suffering, or has suffered, a flagrant denial of justice, the UK judge will scrutinise the case in hand and consider whether extradition would be compatible with the requested person’s Article 6 convention rights. There is no question of a UK court not being able fully to consider whether a requested person is being extradited in circumstances incompatible with their Article 6 rights.