Contribution
My Lords, I place on record my support for the enormous amount of work that has clearly gone into the production of this industrial strategy. It is very evident that those at the Ministry of Defence have put their thinking caps on, done the hard work and constructed a plan based around defence’s current and future requirements. There is therefore much to be applauded. The six priority outcomes are absolutely aiming in the right direction and the commitment to strengthening the MoD’s links with SMEs is particularly welcome.
A strong industrial base is vital for the future of our Armed Forces and our defensive resilience as a whole. The need has never been more evident than today, when we have seen a Russian incursion into a NATO ally’s airspace and the largest attack in Ukraine by Russia to date. This escalation is deeply troubling and underlines the importance of swiftly putting Britain into war-fighting readiness.
This is a solid piece of work, but the caveat is this: the solid piece of work crumbles if the bricks are not cemented together. That cement is implementation at a wartime pace. What matters now is that the words on these pages are translated into missiles, drones, equipment and ships. Critical to this is procurement. The chilling reality is that procurement has essentially dried up. There have been promising words in the SDR, but we have yet to see the major procurement contracts that the MoD has promised.
Procurement is the lifeblood of a successful industrial strategy. For example, I ask the Minister: how will the Government ensure that the Typhoon factory in Warton remains open and thriving? We have heard that the Government will be opening up six new munitions factories, but they must have orders. When will they be placed?
I understand that the promised defence investment plan will detail much of the procurement endeavour, but when? The defence industry has been waiting with bated breath since July of last year, and industry must have greater certainty. I implore the Minister to do everything in his power to ensure that the defence investment plan is published as soon as possible. In that connection, will the UK’s defence orders be joining a queue or with they be prioritised over orders for export?
When it comes to the new structures within the MoD, co-ordination of accountability to the Secretary of State is paramount. At the same time, duplication must be eradicated. The SDR and this strategy both mention the creation of a number of new bodies within the MoD: UK Defence Innovation, the Defence Industrial Joint Council, the office of defence exports, a defence office for small business growth and the national armaments director.
The strategic defence review identified a 10% reduction in Civil Service costs by 2030. Can the Minister clarify how, with the addition of these new offices, the MoD will achieve that staffing cost reduction? What existing structures will be merged or abolished, and who will be auditing progress? While I am on this topic, can the Minister update the House on the progress of appointing the national armaments director?
Page 30 of the industrial strategy details nine milestones to be reached by the end of this year. I do not believe any of these have as yet materialised, and the end of the year is fast approaching. Is the Minister confident that the 2025 timeline will be met?
In conclusion, I raise an issue that will come as no surprise to the Minister—budget. My right honourable friend the shadow Secretary of State and I have raised concerns about the bundling together of intelligence spending within the defence budget. That means that, despite the Government’s claims of spending 2.6% of GDP on defence by 2027, the actual money available to the MoD for defence spending is 2.2% of GDP. I am not trying to catch the Minister out, but I want to make this clear: the Government may have increased defence spending, but this level of spend is simply not enough to deliver everything in the SDR and indeed in this industrial strategy.
The Russian incursion into Polish airspace yesterday and the triggering of Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty serve as a stark warning: complacency is not an option. The contents of this strategy, which, as I have said, these Benches fully support, cannot be a prayer for the future. Wartime pace means delivering from now on and, quite simply, there is no safe alternative.