Contribution
I think AI will increasingly become a mainstay of the battlefield, and how we employ it will become incredibly important. My concern is about the control of AI and knowing that the target we are trying to prosecute is indeed still viable right up to the last safe moment. Once we lose control of a drone and it becomes AI-capable, in theory it could switch to a more preferential target, which may be a good opportunity, or it may be a catastrophe that ends up as front-page news. We need to think carefully about how we employ drones.
On the overall development of drones, another important factor to consider is how we employ the warhead. It is only a matter of time before we look at options such as the replacement of Javelin—I was a Javelin platoon commander when I was in the Army—which has a two-stage warhead, with the first stage penetrating the armour and the second stage going inside the vehicle, exploding and detonating to kill the crew. The application of something like a two-stage warhead to an FPV drone is going to become an increasingly potent threat. It will be interesting to see at what point that emerges on the battlefield.
At tier 3—a level up—we have those platforms that are firmly considered to be survivable. The entry into service of Protector RG mark 1, replacing Reaper, illustrates how the Royal Air Force is moving further into the world of uncrewed air systems. With a ceiling of 40,000 feet and a mission endurance in excess of 30 hours, it marks the next evolution in our drone capability. With an ongoing project to enable it with the low-collateral Brimstone 3, it will be a potent weapons delivery platform, although that project is currently rated at amber.
Indeed, the introduction of remotely piloted aircraft systems—RPAS—as its own stream within RAF pilot training illustrates the complexity of how drones will be used going forwards. We have already seen the SDR outline the desire to introduce a hybrid carrier air wing, with crewed and uncrewed platforms operating alongside one another from our carrier strike group.
That leads us into the category of exquisite capability. The elephant in the room is GCAP—the global combat air programme—a trilateral endeavour with Italy and Japan that aims to deliver a sixth-generation fighter by 2035. I do not wish to derail the debate by talking about the merits and pitfalls of sixth-generation fighters, and whether by the time they arrive we will still need or want an exquisite capability, given how precious we are already about our fifth-generation F-35s, but there is a key issue with the platform as an exquisite capability.
The intention of GCAP is not to have massed squadrons of fighters flying into dogfights over Russia. Those days are long gone; in future, we should expect most, if not all, engagements to take place beyond visual range. Any near-peer conflict will involve formidable air defence that will render the low-level bombing runs of yesteryear the stuff of Hollywood. No, the intention is to operate GCAP as a system of systems: a crewed platform where the pilot is less of a pilot and more an integrated part of the system—effectively, a weapons platform operator co-ordinating the battle space—and where the uncrewed autonomous collaborative platforms, or loyal wingmen, operate as a squadron and conduct the task as an attritable but very expensive asset that can complete the mission without risk to aircrew, impervious to being disabled by ECM, and operating networked to GCAP itself.
The RAF’s autonomous collaborative platform strategy aims to have ACP as an integral part of the RAF force structure by 2030, and we have started to see that being rolled out in recent weeks. This is a concept that I do not believe we can fully afford. The National Infrastructure and Service Transformation Authority already has the future combat air system rated at red—that is not just GCAP but the ACP strategy that accompanies it. It would be one thing to achieve an ACP capability, and another to develop and deliver a sixth-generation fighter, whether on time or decades late, but to deliver both seems fanciful based on the Ministry of Defence’s procurement track record.
In a world where the infantry are still using armoured vehicles that came into service the same year the Beatles released their debut single—closer to the end of the first world war than to today—with no current plans to replace them, I cannot envisage a situation where we have a sovereign fighter jet that ranks as the best in the world and a squadron of drone fighters operating alongside it. We urgently need to start managing our expectation.
The Government talk a good game on RPAS but, for all the talk of increasing the defence budget, our drone strategy looks an incoherent mess. I am sure the Minister will set me straight on whether that is accurate. We are pouring money into exquisite capability while watching the war in Ukraine spiral-develop capability that we have no idea how to use in the last 100 yards. The pace of technological change that is driving the evolution of the threat environment is such that unless we leverage the spiral development capability that already exists here, coupled with the expertise that now exists in Ukraine, British forces will be left behind.