Lord Hunt of Kings Heath (Lab)

My Lords, we come to another interesting clause. In essence, I am trying to find ways to identify those infrastructure developments that are of critical national importance to see whether there is a way in which we can streamline the process of approvals that they have to go through. Also, in picking up the points from the noble Baronesses, Lady Coffey and Lady Pinnock, about the need for democratic legitimacy, I am seeing whether we can use parliamentary processes to help. I am moving Amendment 47 and speaking to Amendments 48, 49, 52, 53 and 65. The two substantive amendments are Amendments 52 and 65. I have two on judicial review which, because of the mystique of groupings for the first day, should really be grouped with a number of other JR amendments that we will come to later, so I will be brief in speaking on those. My Amendment 52, in essence, creates a short, abridged parliamentary process to confirm Ministers’ decisions to give development consent for infrastructure projects as a critical national priority. Apparently, until the late 1990s, we had a system of provisional order confirmation Bills, whereby Parliament could confirm orders made by UK Ministers for various proposals, including infrastructure projects. There are many of these on the statute book so it is, in fact, a tried and tested approach that we could use for some projects where we need to speed up delivery but we need to have parliamentary approval as well. This kind of approach, using a development consent order confirmation Bill, could take only four to six months to go through Parliament, which is nothing like the complexity of the hybrid Bill. We have seen that with HS2, which ultimately failed to satisfy anybody and built in huge delays. We are where we are with HS2. Having said that, the station being built in Birmingham looks pretty good; we can only hope that, one day, a train is actually able to arrive there. The point about this amendment is to give Parliament a vote. I have very much accepted this point about the need for Parliament to have a say in some of these matters. In a sense, this is another trade-off; I am saying that some projects need to be dealt with in a special way—nationally, by being taken by Ministers, by going through the necessary procedures to ensure that they are appropriate and in being given legitimacy by parliamentary vote. It would give businesses and developers much greater certainty about investment decisions and, as I have said, ensure that we have a proper democratic say in these very important decisions. Amendment 53 is related to Amendment 52 and would repeal Section 150 of the Planning Act 2008. I well recall our debates on that regime, because I was a Minister involved in it. The NSIP regime was designed with the intention of being a one-stop shop for major infrastructure projects, in terms of the consents required. However, the effect of Section 150 of the 2008 Act has been to stop development consent orders from being as much of a one-stop shop as they could be, because certain regulators have a veto on whether a DCO can roll consents into it that would otherwise have to be obtained separately from regulators. We have already debated the problem of having multiple regulators involved; they do not seem to be able to work together and co-ordinate their response. I know that there was a debate on a similarly worded amendment that was proposed in the other place. The Government had some concerns about it but promised guidance on how to wrap up other consents in a DCO. However, the problem with that is that the regulators’ veto remains, which is why I argue that it should be moved. My Amendment 65 can be seen in parallel: I seek to enable the Secretary of State to designate certain classes of development as critical national developments; establish an expert critical national developments task force to advise on each application; and provide that planning permission and any other regulatory consent for such development is deemed to be granted six months after the application is made, unless the Secretary of State issues a written objection within that period or extends the period. Of course, here, I am anticipating the response of my noble friend, because I noted that she was not very keen on my earlier amendment on timelines because different infrastructure developments have different requirements and probably different timelines. This amendment allows the Government to be able to sort of flex the timeline according to circumstances. I would argue that, at the moment, Ministers lack a coherent mechanism to prioritise and accelerate delivery of critical infrastructure projects. The DCO regime has not really, in the end, delivered what we hoped it would when we took it through Parliament. I hesitate again to mention Sizewell C, but eight years from application to consent is just hopeless, and I must say that on Heathrow too. I support the third runway at Heathrow, because I think that, as the Government have said, this will take place within carbon budgets, but it is just an example of how decisions here can be stuck for decades, and we really have to move on from that. The amendment I am proposing here would centralise accountability with the Secretary of State. I would align it to my earlier amendment in relation to parliamentary consent. It would bring consents under a single process, introduce a statutory determination deadline and de-risk major investments. There is international precedent for it. The Canadian Government have also faced great delays in major national infrastructure from fragmented approval systems, environmental litigation and federal/provincial conflicts. Recently, the Parliament of Canada has produced a law with very much the same principles as my amendment, which allows the Canadian Cabinet to designate nation-building projects, as they are called, via Orders in Council. I refer to my other three amendments. Amendment 47 seeks to remove the requirement for any planning appeals to be considered at an actual hearing. That, in my view, is a streamlining process. Amendments 48 and 49 are around judicial reviews. I really welcome Clause 12(1), which would restrict judicial review appeals to the Court of Appeal where the High Court decides the application for permission to apply for judicial review is totally without merit. Now, I have already paid tribute to the noble Lord, Lord Banner, for his review; this clause follows that review. We received a very helpful letter from my noble friend the Minister this morning, which gives details about how the Government are going to follow up; that is very welcome indeed, but I just want to probe whether we can go further. Amendment 48 relates to the reviews of NPSs at least every five years, which I warmly welcome. I take my noble friend’s point about the issue with NPSs that have not been subject to a review and therefore could be considered to be out of date. I just want to make sure that judicial reviews are not used in a way which unreasonably might block progress, so my amendment would remove the possibility of JR in two circumstances: in between the five-yearly reviews, by repealing Section 13(2) of the Planning Act 2008, and in relation to any revisions to NPSs that are solely non-material or are reflective changes—in other words, reflective of published government policy change legislation or court judgments which the Bill is providing for. I am a strong believer in the judicial review process. My background is mainly in the health service, and the fact is that NHS bodies are sometimes fast and loose with legislation and guidance, particularly when it comes to the outsourcing of services, changes of use, closures of hospitals and the like. There is no doubt that the judicial review process has been necessary to ensure proper transparency. My problem with judicial review is when it is used, essentially, to try to block progress—hence the amendment. Amendment 49 would bring legal consistency to the Planning Act so that it is the High Court where applications for JR would be made. It is not a substantive change but it would make sure that, in any future event, civil procedure rules cannot be made to divert planning appeals to any court other than the High Court. There is already precedent in Section 63 of the listed buildings Act, which makes it clear that appeals are to be made to the High Court. I think that could flow across the Planning Act. I hesitate to talk about judicial review when the noble Lord, Lord Banner, is present, but it would be good to have at least some debate as to whether, in the light of his review, we could go further. I beg to move.