Lord Hacking (Lab)

My Lords, this group of amendments on the financial penalties raises the very important point of how local authorities are informed of the landlord’s breaches and hence are in a position to impose financial penalties. Without that, there can be no imposition of financial penalties. This issue was raised in our last debate by the noble Baroness, Lady Thornhill, and the noble Lord, Lord Cromwell, relating to police failures. A major thrust throughout this Bill is to curb—or, rather optimistically, to stop—rogue landlords acting illegally. Therefore, we need to realistically identify the rogue landlords. It may sound trite, but they are rogues who have every intention to exploit the law to their benefit or ignore it altogether. It is no good legislating for financial penalties unless the rogue landlord’s breaches are identified and brought to the notice of local authorities so that financial penalties can be applied. Under this Bill, commendable new schemes are being set up. First, there is the private rental sector ombudsman scheme. Secondly, there is the private rental sector database scheme. Thirdly, there are the private sector rent payment orders, otherwise known as RPOs. However, each of these schemes relies on the landlord’s breaches being reported. Moreover, if these breaches are reported to the ombudsman, it is doubtful that the ombudsman, in this entirely civil procedure, has any right to report on the landlord’s breaches to the local authorities. The major potential reporter is the wronged tenant, but history shows that wronged tenants are very reluctant, for obvious reasons, to report their landlords. The answer must therefore be to legislate sensibly and to go for measures that will be most effective against rogue landlords but do not penalise ordinary, lawful and honest landlords. I have to say, politely and respectfully, that this is where this Bill fails. Take the example of the 12-month ban on putting properties back on the market after a failed sale or failed family occupation following evictions on grounds 1 or 1A. The rogue landlord will simply exploit this procedure, fudging dates and taking other steps. This will not provide any effective deterrent to the rogue landlord. Focusing on the wrong that is to be put right—namely, landlords raising the rent after failure of sales or failure of family occupation—my noble friend will remember that I suggested that the much better, more sensible and more directed focus is to ban all rent increases across the market after abortive sales or abortive family occupation. Since that is a simple, across-the-board provision, rogue landlords would find it much more difficult to act in breach. Noble Lords may remember my example of a landlord having sought and obtained eviction of a tenant in order to put his parents into the property and then one of his parents has a stroke and is unable to enter it. That landlord is then left with the penal result of being unable to put the property on the market for 12 months and to collect much-needed rent. Also, it would mean property unnecessarily being unavailable on the rental market, also for a period of 12 months.