Contribution
My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who have contributed. Just, I hope, to bring a little clarity to the latter discussion between my noble friend Lord Harper and the noble Lord, Lord German, as I read it, Clause 13, “Supplying articles for use in immigration crime”, sets out in its first subsection the offence, and it does so neatly separating the actus reus, the actual act—here, offering to supply a relevant article—from the mens rea, which is knowledge or suspicion. Subsection (2) goes on to state:
“It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under this section to show that they had a reasonable excuse”.
It was subsection (2) that we debated at length on the previous day in Committee on this Bill, and it is at that point that the burden of proof shifts to the defence to prove their defence under the subsection.
I am very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Alton of Liverpool, for bringing these amendments. It has proved to be a very stimulating debate. As others have said, I have an immense amount of respect for him, given his long and distinguished career, and I am also grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee. I listened very carefully to what they both said. I have to say that I fundamentally disagree with the amendments that they have brought, however. They seek to alter the mens rea principle in Clauses 13, 14 and 16, by replacing the current standard of knowledge or suspicion with one of “intent” in the case of the amendments of the noble Lord, Lord Alton, or “belief” in the case of the amendments from the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee. It does not seem to me to be in dispute that these amendments, if passed, would introduce a higher and more complex threshold for the mental elements of the offences, thereby raising the requirements for securing conviction and making it significantly more difficult to hold to account those involved in supplying equipment for illegal crossings and other articles used in the facilitation of unlawful entry into the United Kingdom. In doing so, they would risk creating precisely the kind of ambiguity that organised criminal gangs thrive on.
I think it is important to remind ourselves what this clause is designed to address. It is aimed at those who provide the tools that make dangerous, illegal crossings possible: those who supply forged passports, false work permits, dinghies and outboard motors that fuel the people-smuggling trade. These individuals are the logistical agents of criminal networks responsible not only for undermining the security of our borders but for endangering lives.
Let us not forget that more than 20,000 people have now crossed the channel in small boats in 2025 alone and, tragically, some have died in the attempt, fundamentally because the journeys are facilitated by those who care more about profit than human life. If we are to be serious about tackling this, we must ensure that the legal framework is as robust and usable as possible. If we replace the standard of knowledge or suspicion with intention or belief, prosecutors will be forced to demonstrate not merely that a person knew or suspected that their goods would be used for immigration crime but that they positively intended or actively believed that they would be used as such. That is a much higher bar, and one that would inevitably lead to fewer prosecutions, fewer convictions and fewer disruptions to these dangerous criminal networks.
The very thorough report from the Joint Committee said that the current standard in the Bill is a low threshold compared to, for example, intentional recklessness. We note that comparable precursor terrorism offences have a higher mental element, requiring intention to commit or assist in the commission of terrorist acts. I think this was quoted by the noble Lord, Lord Alton. However, as the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, correctly said, these terrorism offences are not precursors and so are not comparable.
The mens rea test of knowledge used in this Bill—the one that the noble Lord and the JCHR have criticised—is the same standard that is used in offences under the Immigration Act 1971, albeit about entry and not the supply of articles. Section 24B(1) of that Act states that:
“A person who … requires leave to enter the United Kingdom under this Act, and … knowingly enters the United Kingdom without such leave, commits an offence”.
The operative word here is “knowingly”. This is the same standard that is applied to the offences in Sections 24(A1), (C1), (D1) and (E1), and Sections 24A, 25 and 25A, of the Immigration Act 1971. In short, existing immigration offences all use the test of knowledge to determine the mental element of an offence. It is therefore entirely consistent for the offences in Clauses 13, 14 and 16 to use the same test.
These are not minor procedural safeguards. These are the tools that we need to dismantle the infrastructure of people smuggling. The law should be a shield for the vulnerable, not a loophole for the criminals who exploit them. We have to construct a strong legal framework, not one that is diluted and less able to protect vulnerable people as a result. My noble friend Lord Harper made the point very powerfully that this is about creating a deterrent. We need to confront this threat with a strong legal arsenal, not a weakened one. We should not be inserting language into this Bill that makes it harder to prosecute those who supply the means for deadly journeys. These are serious offences with serious consequences, and the law must reflect that seriousness. In this instance, I oppose these amendments.