Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)

My Lords, in moving Amendment 15 I will speak also to Amendment 17; both are in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Davies of Gower. I will also reflect briefly on Amendment 16, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee. Amendment 15 is a matter of legal precision. Legal precision, especially in issues as sensitive and complex as immigration enforcement, is a necessity. This amendment would define illegal entry to the United Kingdom with direct reference to Section 24 of the Immigration Act 1971. That Act has long provided the statutory foundation for offences relating to unlawful entry and overstaying. If we are serious about creating a coherent framework for the commander to operate within, we must be clear about what we mean by “illegal entry”. Without this definition, the term is left open to interpretation and could result in confusion, inconsistency and perhaps even legal challenge. By tying a definition directly to the existing law, we would ensure that there is no ambiguity and no risk of the commander operating under uncertain or shifting interpretations. It is a simple, necessary fix and sets widely accepted parameters, not only for our discussion now but for the law once it comes into force. Amendment 17 is likewise rooted in common sense. It defines sea crossings as “journeys by water from another country for the purpose of reaching, and gaining entry into, the United Kingdom”. That is important because it makes it clear that a sea crossing can be regarded as having occurred from any third country. It is vital that we draft this legislation now in a way that allows our enforcement authorities to take robust action to stop this threat. How we define these core terms is important to ensuring that we can do this successfully. We note that the Government’s current intention is to include sea crossings that originate only in France, Belgium or the Netherlands, as is stated in the offence of endangering another during sea crossings in Clause 18. We have an amendment to address that in a later group, so I will not dwell on it now, but suffice it to say that we do not think we should be narrowing the scope of the definition only to crossings that begin in these three countries. They might be the countries that illegal migrants cross from now, but we must ensure that the legislation is future-proofed. Given that the strategy—indeed, much of the public discourse—centres on the dangers and deterrence of these crossings, it is only right that the Bill is clear in defining what it actually refers to. Our amendment would close that gap. I turn briefly to Amendment 16 from the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, which raises an interesting point about whether private bodies carrying out public functions are captured under the definition of “public authority”. I suggest some caution, though: although the intention is to probe and not prescribe, we must be wary of unintentionally expanding the net of liability obligation without fully understanding the operational and legal issues and consequences. If private contractors working at the border are to be brought within the scope of the commander’s influence, that should be considered through a fuller and more deliberative process, and not inserted without clear parameters. So, although I appreciate the spirit of the amendment, I hope the Government can offer some clarification, perhaps in guidance or regulation rather than in primary legislation at this stage. The two amendments in our names are about clarity, consistency and good legislative practice, and they would support the effectiveness of the commander. I urge the Government to support them, and I beg to move.