Contribution
I start by thanking everyone in our armed forces who serves, who has served, and who has fallen. Our country is safer and better because of their service.
In assessing the financial necessity of meeting our defence needs, it is important, first, to look at the state of our world—not only our real adversaries but our potential adversaries, our allies and the most powerful country in the world, the United States. In our country and across the world, there is an assumption that the foreign policy of the current President will be a blip, and I do not believe that to be so. For my constituents and for the House, it is important to reflect on that reality as the country and the Government set their path towards a long-term investment in the defence capabilities that we so desperately need.
The 2017 national security strategy of the United States, released by President Trump, said:
“After being dismissed as a phenomenon of an earlier century, great power competition returned.”
In 2022, the national security strategy released by President Biden said:
“The most pressing strategic challenge facing our vision is from powers that layer authoritarian governance with a revisionist foreign policy.”
In 2017, the era of co-operation, which had defined multiple US presidencies in the post-cold war era, was declared dead by President Trump. In 2022, the era of competition that had defined the Trump era was given new life by President Biden—two contrasting presidencies, two sides of the same coin.
As Russia illegally invaded Ukraine, a sovereign, democratic country, and China made clear its designs on Taiwan, a sovereign, democratic country, those two autocracies have deepened their ties, and they have collaborated more closely with other UK and US rivals. It is clear that the consensus that has been emerging in the beltway was accurate. The main priority of American foreign policy as great power competition is clear. The aspiration of the outcome that the US stays ahead of the pack is clear.
We in this House will debate the motivations, character and behaviour of President Trump. They will be open to interpretation, but, in some important ways, his worldview has a more settled nature. With him and Biden as presidents and the United States as a great power pursuing US interests in a world where competition is the enduring and defining feature, our American ally has for some time now been telling a story about how it sees itself and the world, and we would be foolish to see the current presidency as a blip. It is the continuation of a tradition.
Of course, there are differences between the two presidencies: in their approach to diplomacy and how nationalistically it should be pursued; in their assessment of American interests and how aggressively they should be pursued; in their adherence to American values and how devotedly they should be upheld; and in sum, whether to collaborate with countries with which it has always collaborated, such as the United Kingdom, either as an end in itself—to reinforce and sustain an American-led order of democracies—or as a means to an important end, which is to pursue an economic strength and a national security that traditional democratic allies would seek, too.
The presidencies and presidents do not differ in their assessment of the international system and the need for competition. That is a critical point that will define UK defence decisions this year and in subsequent years. I obviously have a preference for a particular style of behaviour. I would much prefer President Biden’s form of foreign policy, but the outcomes that are being pursued are clear. This prompts the question: will whoever succeeds President Trump deviate from or continue his foreign policy? I argue that it will be a continuation.
If the priority of the US, our closest ally, is to stay ahead of those autocracies in the long term, and we have stronger ties and shared values with the United States as it becomes more competitive with those rivals, it is in our interest to do all that we can to counter the rise of those rivals, to mitigate against their worst behaviours, to minimise their risk to our security and to militate against their threats to our values—with the United States wherever possible, and with other democracies that make the same assessment of our threat. That is why it is so important that we invest in our defence capabilities.
We are making the largest sustained increase to defence spending. We have boosted defence spending by £5 billion this year, and we are committed to spending 4.1% of our GDP by 2027, and 5% by 2035. I commend that strongly given the international circumstances that we face. It is so important that we achieve that, and we must educate our constituents about why that is. In this House, it is important that we bring the right scrutiny to our defence decisions.