Contribution
Briefly, I would like to express my support for new clause 11. I declare my interest, as I am chair of the RMT parliamentary group and this issue is part of our campaigning, particularly given the rising number of assaults on bus drivers at the moment. I also express my support for new clause 13, and congratulate the hon. Member for Liverpool Riverside (Kim Johnson) on her determined campaign on the joint enterprise initiative. Of course, I also support new clause 50, which deals with the right to protest, and who could not support new clause 122 after the speeches we have heard from Labour Members today?
I want to raise an anomaly that has arisen in debates about terrorism legislation since 2020. I do not want to go into too much technical detail, but basically, section 69(3) of the Sentencing Act 2020 gave the Crown Prosecution Service the power to allege a terrorist connection
“if the offence…(a) is, or takes place in the course of, an act of terrorism, or (b) is committed for the purposes of terrorism.”
The implementation of that legislation meant that if an offence was determined to have a terrorist connection, the sentences became aggravated and harsher restrictions were imposed, both within prison and on release. I believe that had cross-party support—there was no problem with it.
However, in 2021, the Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Act came along. The powers in the Sentencing Act related to schedule 1 offences such as murder, kidnapping and hijacking—things that we would naturally consider to be terrorism. The Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Act extended the use of that definition to an offence that is
“punishable on indictment with imprisonment for more than 2 years”.
By moving away from a schedule of offences, almost any offence before the Crown court meeting that definition was brought into consideration. For example, protest cases involving damages of more than £5,000 became interpreted as terrorist-connected cases.
When we have had discussions about terrorism, we have always had problems with definition. Lord Carlile did a report for us way back in 2007, and he said that jury trial is one of the guards that can assist in protecting us from the misinterpretation of the range of definition. He said that
“jury trial provides an important protection against prosecutions the public find unreasonable or arbitrary.”
The problem is that the use of this section of the Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Act 2021 does not involve juries. Such things are not brought before a jury; it is applied only by the judge at sentencing.
As a result, we have found that since late 2024, the provisions in the 2021 Act have been deployed for the first time against protesters. Someone who has possibly committed criminal damage, aggravated burglary or, yes, violent disorder in a protest activity now finds themselves with a terrorist connection allegation. That will never be brought before a jury, because it will be applied only at sentencing. Amnesty International has expressed its concern about direct action protests being subject to the UK’s overly broad definition of terrorism laws, which are
“open to misuse and abuse”.
Four UN rapporteurs have expressed their concerns to the Government about the misuse of the terrorism legislation in this instance. They have said that the legislation is being used against political prisoners, which is raising concerns about the potential infringement of their fundamental rights.
I raise that issue here because an increasing number of cases are being trapped by a misinterpretation of the legislation that we brought forward in 2020 and 2021. That is resulting, I think, in injustices and miscarriages of justice, an anomaly which we will have to address at some point if we do not address in this Bill, to correct a crucial misinterpretation of what this House intended back in 2021.