Contribution
My Lords, the amendments in this group are all in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Barran. Just taking the amendments as they are, the majority of residential settings are owned by provider groups—organisations that own the providers that run settings. The legislation refers to provider groups as “parent undertakings”. Provider groups have influence over how a setting is run, yet they are not accountable in legislation for the quality of the settings they own.
Clause 12 is intended to complement Ofsted’s existing powers. It will allow Ofsted to take action at scale and pace to improve the quality of care when it reasonably suspects that two or more of the provider group settings are not meeting regulatory requirements. In answer to the noble Baroness’s question, together with Clause 13, which provides additional enforcement powers for Ofsted, it is part of this Government’s strategy to ensure the safety and well-being of vulnerable children in care.
Amendments 135 and 136 seek to give Ofsted the power to inspect provider groups. Inspection is not necessary at provider group level. Given the existing robust regime for the inspection of settings, the inspection of provider groups would not give Ofsted any additional information that it does not already have to ensure quality of care and the safeguarding of children’s settings, which is obviously the purpose of what we intend to do here.
The inspection of provider groups would add substantial burden to the public purse and would not result in improvements to the quality of care for children, as inspections would focus on provider group policies rather than on the lived experience of children. Additionally, they would not be effective in holding provider groups to account without establishing a burdensome inspection system. Given that there are over 400 provider groups, I think we understand the scale of the additional work that we are talking about.
The clause gives Ofsted the power to serve an improvement plan notice on a provider group to improve quality in two or more of its settings. This is vital, as it will ensure the quickest and most effective action to secure change at scale. Clause 13, which we will come to shortly, gives Ofsted powers to take action against the provider groups when they do not improve the quality of their settings. This amendment would not impose any requirements on the provider groups that Ofsted could enforce against.
Amendment 137 seeks to empower Ofsted to use the services of an independent person, as provided for by Regulation 44 of the Children’s Homes (England) Regulations, to carry out an unannounced visit to a children’s home for administrative breaches or minor concerns about the quality of care being provided. The amendment proposes that, after an independent person has inspected the children’s homes or home, the local authority may issue an improvement plan notice based on the findings.
Under current regulations, the registered person of a children’s home must ensure that an independent person visits the home at least once each month, and this visit may be unannounced. The independent person should have the skills and understanding necessary to form an impartial judgment about the quality of the home’s care. They must produce a report about their visit which sets out their opinion on whether children are effectively safeguarded and whether the home effectively promotes children’s well-being.
Ofsted, the placing authorities and the registered provider, registered manager and responsible individual must be given a copy of the report. The local authority where the home is located must also be given the report if it requests it. Ofsted uses these reports to inform whether further activity or inspection is necessary. They may be used to inform Ofsted decision-making around improvement plan notices to ensure its effective role as the regulator. Ofsted must be the only body responsible for issuing improvement plan notices. Giving local authorities the power to issue an improvement plan notice would mean duplication and would offer no protection additional to what is already in place.
Amendment 138 seeks to probe how an improvement plan might work in practice. Provider oversight has been designed to enable Ofsted to address poor-quality care at scale and at pace. For example, where Ofsted inspects two children’s homes and believes quality is being impacted by the provider group’s policies or management, it could reasonably suspect that those issues were in all homes owned by the provider group. It would be able to use the new powers to ensure that the provider group drove up standards in all its homes.
The provider group would be required to develop and implement an improvement plan to address the issues identified by Ofsted as being of concern. This plan will be approved by Ofsted, if it is satisfied that it will be effective in addressing the concerns. Ofsted can fine the provider group if it fails to submit or implement the improvement plan. When Ofsted is satisfied that improvements have been made, it will consider the plan completed. This will result in improvement in multiple settings simultaneously, which could not be achieved through inspection of provider groups, as would happen if Amendments 135 and 136 were adopted.
Finally, Amendments 138A, 138B and 138C seek to require Ofsted to notify the relevant local authority when an improvement plan notice has been served, cancelled or appealed. Ofsted is currently required to notify all local authorities where certain enforcement actions such as suspension or cancellation of registration are taken. Clause 13 amends these requirements to include a requirement for Ofsted to notify all local authorities where a provider group is issued with a monetary penalty for failing to prepare or implement an improvement plan. This is a more proportionate balance for ensuring local authorities are aware of problems arising and ensuring that children’s accommodation is not unnecessarily disrupted. Not only would additional notifications, as required by these amendments, require significant extra resources both from Ofsted and from local authorities, but the notifications would prove unnecessary where issues were resolved or successfully challenged.
It is important to stress that provider oversight will not be the only tool in Ofsted’s toolbox to tackle poor-quality care where it finds it; it will continue to have its existing powers to work with individual homes, including suspending or cancelling their registration, if it has serious concerns.
I recognise that the noble Baroness, Lady Barran, has asked some detailed questions, as it is her right to do. I am sure that she will understand that I do not have all the answers at my fingertips and that she will give me the space to look specifically at the issues that she has raised. I shall write to her and make sure the responses are shared with Members in the usual way.