Lord Hunt of Wirral (Con)

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Prentis of Leeds, for describing this amendment to us. It is simple and easy to understand but founded on a very difficult and testing industrial dispute. Looking back over my time as a parliamentarian, I often found that facts get distorted, beliefs underpinned and positions entrenched. The last thing that should ever happen is an overt change in the law. I do not believe that is necessary. Let me explain why. The Minister should not support this amendment, which, as the noble Lord, Lord Prentis, explained, seeks to extend Section 145A of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 to cover the exclusion or omission of a worker from an offer on grounds related to trade union membership or activity. While the noble Lord presented this amendment as a measure to strengthen workers’ rights and reinforce freedom of association, in reality, on reflection, as he virtually admitted when he introduced it, it is poorly drafted, conceptually flawed, legally confusing and potentially deeply damaging to the legitimate and practical functioning of workplace relations. At its core, the amendment misunderstands the balance that needs to be struck between protecting the rights of trade union members and preserving the autonomy of employers to make operational decisions in good faith. The current law already provides robust protections against unlawful inducements that seek to undermine collective bargaining. I recall, because I was in government at the time, that Sections 145A and 145B were carefully crafted to target deliberate attempts by employers to bypass or undermine collective agreements. This amendment goes significantly beyond that, seeking to introduce for the first time in statute a wholly ambiguous and legally unstable concept—exclusion from an offer—without providing any meaningful guidance or definition as to what such exclusion means, how it is to be assessed and in what contexts it is to be deemed unlawful. An offer, by its very nature, is made on the basis of specific criteria—sometimes economic, sometimes strategic and sometimes tied to an individual’s performance or to business need. To say that a worker has a right not to be omitted from any offer and to link any such omission to trade union membership or activity would place an intolerable burden on employers. It would open the door to speculative claims and second-guessing of decisions that may have been made for entirely legitimate and neutral reasons, relying on an inference of motive in the absence of solid evidence. Effectively, it demands that employers should treat all workers identically in every instance of any offer—whether it is financial, procedural or preferential—or face litigation and the reversal of the burden of proof. Let me explain. The amendment proposes that in any case brought under the new Section 145A(1A), it will fall to the employer to demonstrate the grounds upon which the worker was excluded. That is a fundamental reversal of the ordinary legal principle that a claimant must prove their case. It turns routine management discretion into presumed unlawful conduct unless proven otherwise. Such a reversal may be appropriate in narrow cases where discrimination is clearly alleged and supported by a pattern of conduct, but to write it into statute so broadly and in such general terms is not only disproportionate, it is potentially destructive to employer-employee trust and clarity. No employer, however well intentioned, will be able to manage negotiations or individual agreements with confidence under such a regime. Furthermore, the amendment also risks creating legal confusion by overlapping with other provisions already in place to protect against victimisation or unfair treatment. Section 146 already protects against detriment related to trade union activities. Section 145A already prohibits inducements that would bypass collective bargaining. If the goal is to ensure fair treatment of trade union members, the proper route is through targeted enforcement of those provisions, not through the introduction of vague and speculative new rights that overlap and conflict with existing law. The amendment is also unbalanced in its approach. It fails to consider that there are many reasons why an individual might not be included in an offer that are entirely unconnected to trade union status. It might be on account of their role, their location, the timing of their employment or performance-based factors. Yet under the proposed amendment, a worker could simply allege that their omission was because of trade union membership or activity, and the burden would shift entirely to the employer to justify its actions. That is not just an invitation to abuse; it is a structural distortion of fairness in employment law. It must also be acknowledged that this amendment could have chilling effects on legitimate collective bargaining. Employers may feel compelled to make across-the-board offers rather than engaging in more flexible, targeted negotiations that take into account differences in role, responsibility or need. That could undermine not only business efficiency but also the ability of unions themselves to secure advantageous outcomes for specific groups of members. The very act of negotiating special terms for one group might now trigger complaints from others, citing this amendment as grounds for a claim of exclusion. In conclusion, let me be absolutely clear: freedom of association is a vital right and must be protected. I do not believe, however, it would be served by new laws that are unclear, that burden employers without cause or that generate more confusion than clarity. This amendment—despite its rhetorical appeal to equality and fairness—will in practice be a blunt and imprecise instrument, increasing litigation, reducing operational flexibility and contributing little, if anything, to the genuine promotion of union rights. I hope the Minister will agree with that.