Lord Bew (CB)

My Lords, it is with considerable regret that I rise to oppose the regret Motion from the noble Lord, Lord Frost, because I respect enormously the work that the noble Lord did on this question when he was in government. I wish to stress in particular tonight that the introduction of unilateral grace periods was the beginning of the fight-back against the authoritarian implications of the 2017 EU-UK agreement. That was of considerable importance and helped to give us space for further developments—developments with which, I understand from listening to him, he is now radically dissatisfied. I am not satisfied; I am rather less dissatisfied. It is crucial to understand that the 2017 EU-UK agreement is the core of the ideas that are then to be found in the protocol—that is absolutely clear. It is important to understand also that that agreement involved a flouting of key elements in the Good Friday agreement. Strand 3 of the Good Friday agreement insists that there be harmonious mutually beneficial relationships between Northern Ireland and the rest of the UK. Nobody could see how those mutually beneficial relationships could remain in the full implementation of the 2017 EU-UK agreement. One of the key themes of that agreement is that the British Government were compelled to commit themselves to supporting an island economy. Look at the Good Friday agreement and the frame- work document that precedes it: it is explicitly about co-operation between two economies on the island of Ireland. To the surprise of many economists who believed that there should be more of an island economy in the early years of the 20th century, suddenly there was a thing called the island economy. By the way, in certain respects there is: in electricity, the dairy industry and so on. But there is not, overall, an island economy—there is absolutely no question about that—and the two economies on the island of Ireland remain a profound reality. Funnily enough, in recent weeks, as a result of Donald Trump’s probings—is that the right word?—of the Irish economy, the indignant insistence all over the Irish press and media that there are two economies on the island of Ireland has become explosive. But the island economy, and the British Government’s commitment to support it, was one of the great problems in the 2017 agreement and the protocols—both the May and the Johnson versions. It is based on a very unrealistic assessment of the realities of the island economy. In the Gallimard edition of Michel Barnier’s memoir, around pages 137 to 140, there is a discussion of Ireland that is largely mythical. None the less, these mythical concepts became the heart of policy and, more importantly, a British Government were compelled to support that. If the Windsor Framework has been treated very dustily tonight, there is one thing it does: it calls a stop to that. It says no, and the European Union agrees. It is absolutely explicit. The island economy driver of policy for the British Government and the dynamic alignment that people have talked about are dispelled by the Windsor Framework. That is one of the achievements of the Windsor Framework and why it played a role in the return of Stormont. This was followed by the Safeguarding the Union document, the importance of which was to demonstrate, on the subject of the Irish Sea border, that, for large parts of the history of the union—for many decades—there has been an Irish Sea border of one sort or another. It is absolutely explicit—it reproduces the documents. You cannot say that the Irish Sea border as such is corrosive of the union; the union somehow survives. The phenomenon known as the Irish Sea border is in a different form today, but what is not in doubt is that it is not corrosive of the union as such. That, again, is one of the important things about the Safeguarding the Union document. The other important thing is that it lays out the first declaration of something that is now commonplace in debate in this House: the necessary role of the Northern Ireland defence industries in the protection of the United Kingdom. It makes this absolutely clear, and it is the first signal of something that this Government have taken up very strongly. One of the reasons why I mention this is: where is the dynamic alignment with the Irish Republic, when we are emphasising above all the importance of the defence industries of Northern Ireland in the defence of the United Kingdom? It is important to remember these realities. As I listened, I pictured the frustrations of life with the Windsor Framework. There are many such frustrations. The new SPS agreement may help, and I hope it does. One thing is clear, and the noble Lord, Lord Empey, made the point: one can no longer say in Northern Ireland that we alone are rule takers from the EU. The whole of the rest of the United Kingdom will now be rule takers from the whole of the EU in a different sense. The reason why it is fundamentally democratic is that this Parliament has a right to make these decisions. Traditional unionism always accepted that. In the 1930s, when traditional unionism disliked the 1938 agreement, it still said, “Nothing to do with Stormont’s decisions. It is up to this Parliament to make these decisions, even if we are uneasy and dislike the various provisions of a particular trade agreement”. That is what traditional unionism stands for: the idea that this Parliament has a right to make these decisions. They are often very difficult and, it so happens, often very unsatisfactory in Northern Ireland. There are difficulties. The University of Ulster economist Dr Esmond Birnie has been quite right to insist—other speakers have mentioned it tonight—about the fall-off in trade from Great Britain into Northern Ireland, particularly smaller concerns. The paperwork has put off smaller concerns exporting from the rest of the United Kingdom into Northern Ireland. There is absolutely no question that this is a problem, but there is also no doubt, for example, that many Northern Ireland businesses enjoy dual access and enjoy the access to the Irish Republic. There is no doubt that the Ulster Farmers’ Union seems increasingly relaxed, especially in the context of possible new SPS arrangements, about the Windsor Framework. So, while it is perfectly correct that there are many unsatisfactory aspects of the current reality—Dr Esmond Birnie in particular has drawn careful and precise attention to this, and I hope the Government will pay attention to the various scholarly papers that he has produced—and while there is no doubt that these possibilities exist, there are also areas of success. The services industry in Northern Ireland is doing far better than anybody expected at this point. It is protected in the Windsor Framework quite explicitly and is doing far better than anybody—certainly myself—expected at this particular point in history. Finally, I will say something on the point of phytosanitary arrangements. Back in the days of the BSE crisis, Dr Ian Paisley, leader of the DUP, went into No. 10 and said to Tony Blair, “I need to tell you that my farmers are British but my cattle are Irish”, because he wanted to make special arrangements. BSE was not so marked a feature in Northern Ireland as it was in the rest of the United Kingdom and, basically, he wanted a privileged relationship for Northern Irish farmers—“My farmers are British, but my cattle are Irish; respect that they currently do not have the same levels of BSE as they have in Derbyshire”. The logic behind this legislation is, “My gardeners are British but my plants are Irish”. It is hard to dispute or argue with it. Finally, the noble Lord, Lord Frost, talked about those who suggest that you have to live with ambiguity and compromise in Northern Ireland. He expressed doubt and said that some of these compromises had been very unsatisfactory in the past 25 years. I am absolutely certain that there is no way that Northern Ireland can survive as part of the United Kingdom without compromise of the sort that has been made. He mentioned, for example, the logic of the Good Friday agreement. I am also clear in my mind that the union is never going to be available on exclusively unionist terms. That does not mean that the union is not available—the union has, at this point, a strong future ahead of it—but it is not going to be available on exclusively unionist terms. This is the point that we all have to accept. There is irreducibly an element here. I have criticised the Irish negotiators of that agreement in 2017; they overplayed their hand, and the best Irish officials, in my view, now accept that. It left a lot of problems that the noble Lord, Lord Frost, had to struggle with, and in the first instance dealt with successfully. It left lots of problems, but the truth of the matter is that there are these two identities and Northern Ireland does face both ways. This cannot be avoided in the settlement, which must involve, at some level, a compromise. The protocol was definitely unfair to the mainstream unionist community, but the idea that we can just drop the Windsor Framework now—which, as I pointed out, has significant elements that work well for the unionist community—is not realistic.