Contribution
My Lords, I note the Minister’s remarks about the withdrawal of some government amendments. I will not go through them all. I look forward to their redrafting. I start by making the small point that there is an element of unpreparedness to the Bill. I realise that there is quite a lot of work in progress. My understanding is that it is an unusual approach to take, to withdraw and then redraft. The Minister will probably say that I am going too far, and I therefore look to a further explanation of that point.
Putting that to one side, the amendments that the Government have tabled appear at least in principle to be sensible changes, which permit a tribunal to extend the time limit for bringing an appeal about a direct deduction order. This relates to a DDO appeal in the public sector section of the Bill but also, as I understand it, in the DWP section, as it applies to the eligibility verification notice in respect of the agreed arrangements between the banks and the DWP. Here I refer to government Amendment 87 in particular.
However, this provides me with an opportunity to do a bit of questioning. Can the Minister outline some of the situations in which the tribunal could consider it “reasonable” to grant an extension to the review period? I suspect she will say that this is up to the tribunal to decide, but it would be helpful to understand the obvious reasons—and some of the less obvious reasons—why the tribunal could offer some leniency.
I presume that the appeal process would include an appeal not just on the DDO but to delay a payment of the DDO and to seek a reduction in the amount payable per week, with the total amount payable over a longer period. Is there an expectation that a longer period has a maximum length of time applied and a cut-off? Otherwise, it could be endless.
In the process of considering and drafting this amendment, I am sure that the Government have had regard to precedent and to how this provision has been used in other Acts. I am aware that similar provision exists in other statutes and, if the Minister could share examples with us of where extensions have been granted to individuals, why and for how long, it would help and allow the Committee to understand the practical ramifications of this amendment. I hope that the circumstances are exceptional, but the wording used in the amendment is for it to be seen as
“reasonable in all the circumstances”.
I hope that that adds to my argument.
Are there parallels to be drawn and lessons learned—for example, from the child maintenance system, for which I had responsibility—where the paying parent is defaulting on DDO payments and the tribunal system is therefore involved? Can some analogies be created?
As I said earlier, there is merit in seeking to allow greater flexibility in granting an appeal. Individuals should have adequate opportunity to exercise this right, but within reason. The amendment is, to that extent, well intentioned and it is something that we support. However, we must also be alive to the risk posed by so-called bad actors. We must ensure that flexibility does not come at the cost of action. We need to make sure that this appeal system allows those with genuine concerns to be heard and recognised, while minimising opportunities for vexatious complaints that are designed to delay and clog up the system, rather than use it responsibly. For example, it could be easy for an individual to claim that he is not able to fulfil his obligations to pay his DDO because, he states, he is suffering from mental health problems or has fluctuating psychotic episodes. What is the tried and tested system for tribunals to assess these claims thoroughly and have the necessary powers to refute or rebut what may be deliberate and vexatious claims?
In seeking precedent here, what is the experience of appeals to tribunals in other sectors—on the volume of cases, the exceptions and the knock-on effect on courts’ resourcing and delays to all cases in the pipeline? It would be most welcome to have some further clarity from the Minister about the considerations that she has towards the amendment, particularly in reference to precedent, which gives us some idea of how this is going to work.
I finish by echoing the words from my noble friend Lady Finn, who said on the last group—and she is right—that fraud against the taxpayer must be confronted robustly. My arguments on this group form the basis of that.