Lord Hunt of Wirral (Con)

My Lords, I rise to speak to Amendments 208A, 209A, 210, 210A, 213A and 213B, standing in my name. Those first amendments remove the reference to communication with workers as an element of access agreements between unions and employers. They further remove provisions that attempt to cement that right to communicate by any and all means, and which prohibit a party from relying on the availability of physical or non-physical communication as a reason to limit the other. Taken together, these provisions amount to a significant and unjustified broadening of what has traditionally been a clearly understood and workable arrangement: namely, the right of union officials physically to enter a workplace for legitimate access purposes. This access, by its nature, has always been specific, scheduled and carried out in a manner agreed upon by both parties. It is bounded in both scope and form. The Bill as drafted risks blurring those lines in ways that introduce legal ambiguity, managerial uncertainty and operational disruption. The reference to communication “by any means, whether directly or indirectly” is particularly concerning. This is an extremely wide formulation that is open-ended in both language and intent. It creates uncertainty not just in principle, but in practice. What exactly does indirect communication mean in the context of an access agreement? Does it encompass digital platforms, printed material, third-party intermediaries, or perhaps the passive dissemination of content in workplace systems? Without clear boundaries, employers will be left navigating uncharted waters, unsure of what they are obliged to permit and what may lawfully be resisted. We must also think about how such broad phrasing sits alongside an employer’s duty to maintain a safe, orderly and productive working environment. Workplaces are complex ecosystems. They are governed by routines, procedures and, crucially, the employer’s ability to direct the operation of their business. If union officials are granted sweeping rights to communicate “by any means”, without the tether of physical presence and supervision, there is a genuine risk that communications will occur in ways that distract, disrupt or even divide—not necessarily through bad faith, but a lack of structure. Equally problematic are the provisions that state that physical entry to a workplace should not be refused simply because non-physical means of communication exist, and vice versa. These clauses, while perhaps intended to protect flexibility, in fact remove the very discretion that employers must retain in managing their own premises. They suggest that the availability of one channel of communication can never justify the refusal of another, regardless of context. Surely that is both inflexible and unrealistic. There may be very good practical reasons for an employer to prefer one form of engagement over another; a highly secure site may welcome scheduled, in-person access, but find unsolicited, off-site communications disruptive or invasive. A remote or hybrid workforce may prefer written updates to physical visits. By attempting to lock in symmetrical rights to both physical and non-physical communication, the Bill as drafted risks creating conflict where co-operation is needed and rigidity where discretion would be more effective. Moreover, we should not lose sight of the fact that union engagement can and does occur outside the framework of statutory access agreements. The purpose of this legislation is not to create an open-ended entitlement for unions to interact with workers in any manner they choose; it is to provide a draft legal mechanism for arranging workplace access for legitimate purposes—access that must be reasonable, structured and proportionate. That mechanism surely must not become a Trojan horse for a much broader intervention in the management of communications within private enterprises. The cumulative effect of these provisions, if left unamended, would be to tilt the balance too far, away from the well-established equilibrium between union representation and employer control. They would introduce legal uncertainty, operational disruption and potential privacy concerns, all under the banner of modernising union access. It is vital that we place Amendment 210 in the proper context. The idea that unions could gain access to employers’ digital platforms, including internal communication systems, company email servers and private digital infrastructure, was not part of the original Bill but was added by the Government in the other House only on Report, with minimal explanation and no real opportunity for detailed parliamentary scrutiny. That is simply not acceptable. This House is now the first truly to consider the full implications of what would, without question, be a major expansion of union access rights into employers’ private and operational space—not their physical space, but their digital infrastructure which is, in many ways, just as sensitive, just as regulated and potentially far more vulnerable. I believe that we must take our scrutiny role very seriously and that this House must now do what the other House was denied the opportunity to do: we have to probe this new power fully and openly. We are now confronted with a proposal that, for the first time ever, would allow trade unions to reach employees via internal platforms such as company intranets, corporate email systems, Zoom, Microsoft Teams and other work-based communication tools, many of which are governed by strict internal policies, compliance frameworks and even sectoral security requirements. This is not a theoretical concern. The Bill now provides a broad enabling power, with the detail to be filled in later through secondary legislation. We do not yet know which platforms will be in scope, how frequently unions will be permitted to post or engage, or what rights employers will have to review, edit or even be informed of the content beforehand. We are being asked to legislate on the basis of a skeleton—a blank cheque—with the flesh to be added later by statutory instrument, and that is precisely when parliamentary control is at its weakest. It is in secondary legislation where the balance of scrutiny too often shifts from robust parliamentary debate to rubber-stamping. So what are we really dealing with here? Employers will, under the current drafting, be expected to engage constructively with union requests for digital access and will be given as little as five working days to respond. This is not merely hypothetical; this is a system designed to operate particularly in workplaces where physical access may be difficult or impossible—for example, remote teams, field-based staff and distributed or digital-first organisations. This may sound practical in theory, but it raises serious unresolved operational questions in practice. Who controls the messaging? Who controls the content? Who approves it? Can unions directly upload material on to a company’s internal platforms, or is it the employer’s responsibility to upload union-drafted content? In that case, does the employer have the right to make edits or raise objections? Can the material be branded? Must it be neutral? Will it sit alongside or appear to compete with official communications from HR or leadership teams? So will the Government publish guidance? If so, when? At the moment, we just do not know the answers to any of these questions. These are not small matters; they are foundational issues of governance, internal messaging and even risk. For some employers, particularly in finance, defence and data-sensitive sectors, internal systems are subject to strict regulation and security controls. Can they allow access to these platforms without compromising legal obligations? In some cases, they may not be able to grant access, even if they wish to, and in others they may face exposure to reputational or compliance risks if improper messaging is circulated without oversight. We must also consider the precedent being set. Allowing third-party organisations, however well-intentioned, to access digital systems designed for internal business-related purposes represents a significant departure from current practice. The potential for confusion, conflicting messaging and unintended consequences is high. This should not be rushed through under cover of secondary legislation. For all those reasons, the amendment before us is entirely justified. It places a necessary brake on an overreach that has not been debated or examined and certainly not consented to by both Houses. If the Government believe that digital access is necessary and can be sensibly and safely managed, then let them bring forward a fully detailed proposal in the proper way. Let us have the opportunity to debate that openly, with all the facts in front of us—not as an afterthought or implication and certainly not as a quietly drafted regulation. I therefore strongly urge your Lordships to support this amendment. Let us draw a clear line around what “access” means in this legislation and what it does not. If Parliament is to grant new powers, it must scrutinise them fully, which is what this Chamber is supposed to do. I turn to Amendment 213B, which goes directly to the operational realities of the modern workplace—the way in which access is exercised, whether it involves scheduled meetings, ad hoc visits, group briefings or one-on-one discussions. That all can have a substantial effect on day-to-day operations. The frequency and timing of those visits matter enormously. Daily interruptions at peak hours are not the same as occasional meetings during quieter periods. Repeated unfocused access can, however unintentionally, become disruptive, particularly in sectors where workflow depends on concentration, safety procedures or continuous operations.