The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)

My Lords, I am grateful to the Committee for allowing us to debate the four regulations relating to the foreign influence registration scheme as a single unit, but if noble Lords wish to discuss individual matters relating to them then we can do so. I know that, before I came to this House, noble Lords were instrumental in scrutinising and improving the foreign influence registration scheme during the passage of the National Security Act, and I am grateful for their consideration to date. There are four instruments to cover; I hope I can speak to them for possibly a little bit longer than I might normally have done just to outline where we are. Noble Lords will know that, on 1 April, the Government announced the foreign influence registration scheme—FIRS, as I will call it—which I can confirm will go live on 1 July 2025. The Government also announced recently that Russia would join Iran on the enhanced tier of the scheme. FIRS, as set out in Part 4 of the National Security Act 2023, will serve as a critical tool in our efforts to deter and disrupt hostile state activity. It will also enhance transparency around the influence exerted by foreign powers in our democratic process. As noble Lords will know, the scheme is underpinned by three principal objectives. The first is transparency. The scheme will require individuals who undertake certain activities on behalf of foreign powers to declare them. Where such activities constitute political influence, the relevant details will be published on a public register, ensuring openness and accountability. The second objective is deterrence. The scheme requires those engaged in malign activities for foreign powers either to cease such contact or to register it formally with the Government. The final objective is disruption. Failure to disclose relevant associations with foreign powers is an offence. This will be enforced by law enforcement, which can take decisive action against those who seek to conceal foreign state involvement. I hope that that broad principle is welcomed by the Committee; I know that it is. I turn to the four instruments before us. First, on Russia and Iran, the first two sets of regulations specify the entirety of the Iranian and Russian states on the enhanced tier of the scheme. This means, for Iran, the Supreme Leader; the whole of the Government, including the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps; the Islamic Consultative Assembly of Iran; and the judiciary of Iran. For Russia, this includes the President of Russia; Cabinet Ministers; government ministries; regional Governments; the judiciary; and the legislature. As my colleague, Dan Jarvis, the Minister for Security, set out in a Statement to the House of Commons: “The Iranian regime is targeting dissidents, and media organisations and journalists reporting on the regime’s violent oppression. It is also no secret that there is a long-standing pattern of the Iranian intelligence services targeting Jewish and Israeli people internationally”.—[Official Report, Commons, 4/3/25; col. 195.] As noble Lords will know, Russia poses an acute threat to UK security. In recent years, its hostile acts have included the deadly nerve agent attack that we witnessed in Salisbury, espionage, arson, and cyberattacks, including the targeting of UK parliamentarians through spear phishing campaigns. Specifying Russia and Iran on the enhanced tier will mean that anyone acting at their direction in the United Kingdom will face a choice: either they declare their activities to the UK Government or they risk five years’ imprisonment. That choice is down to them from the beginning of the scheme on 1 July. Both sets of regulations include a statutory five-year review period and a grace period for those who are in ongoing arrangements at the point of the scheme coming into force in order to allow them to register arrangements without there being a need to impact on legitimate activities. We have also set a number of exemptions in the scheme. This set of regulations introduces four new exemptions to the scheme. These exemptions, which sit alongside those already set out in primary legislation, are designed to uphold the principle of proportionality. They reduce the burden of registering routine or already transparent activities while ensuring that the scheme remains focused on addressing genuine risks. For example, these regulations include an exemption from the political influence tier of the scheme for a foreign power investment fund; this is intended to cover sovereign wealth funds and certain public pension funds. Then there are three exemptions from the enhanced tier. First, there is an exemption for funded study arrangements, such as scholarships awarded by foreign Governments. Secondly, there is an exemption for activities related to government administrative and technical services, such as those concerning nationality, immigration and tax-related services. Thirdly, there is an exemption for public bodies and arrangements to which they are party. Each of these exemptions has been carefully and narrowly defined to prevent the creation of loopholes that could be exploited for malign purposes. For example, a student from Russia or Iran on a government-funded scholarship would be exempt only in relation to activities directly connected to their course of study. Any other activity undertaken on behalf of those states would still require registration. The final set of regulations concerns the operation of the public register, and I will talk a little now about publication. In my view, that is central to delivering the scheme’s transparency objectives. The regulations set out the categories of information that will be published on the register. They are carefully limited to what is necessary to fulfil the scheme’s transparency aims, while ensuring appropriate safeguards for individual privacy. By default, registrations relating to political influence activities will appear on the public register. Where activities extend beyond political influence, they are registered on the enhanced tier and will not be published. It is important to emphasise that individuals and organisations that register under the scheme, and whose details appear on the public register, are acting responsibly and in support of transparency. The regulations also set out the information that may not appear on the register where it has been demonstrated that publication would be prejudicial to the safety or interests of the UK, or to the prevention of crime, a criminal investigation or criminal proceedings; where it would put an individual’s safety at risk; or where it could result in the disclosure of commercially sensitive information. Lastly, the regulations also provide for information to remain on the public register for a period of 10 years following the conclusion of the relevant activity. This retention period is particularly important for identifying long-term trends and patterns in foreign influence. There is legitimate activity, of course, and I want to be clear that the scheme does not seek to deter that legitimate activity. Registering with the scheme does not mean that an individual is doing anything wrong, nor that they must cease their activities. We are also taking steps to ensure that registration remains as straightforward and simple as possible, and that those affected by the scheme are aware of what they need to do to comply. To conclude—I apologise for giving great detail on the four instruments before the Committee—self-evidently, the first duty of the Government is to keep our country safe; I know that view is shared across the Committee. That is why the Prime Minister placed national security at the heart of his plan for change. It is also why we are supporting the police and intelligence services to confront and combat the threats we face, including those from foreign states. The measures before us are among our decisive steps to bring into force the foreign influence registration scheme. I look forward to comments and questions from noble Lords, and I commend the regulations to the Committee.