Lord Davies of Gower (Con)

Indeed—I think I will cover that point as I go along. Although we support the intent and scope of these measures, scrutiny must not end there. These regulations are not purely technical instruments; they go to the heart of how the UK responds to evolving and increasingly sophisticated state threats. It is in that spirit that I raise three points. First, the omission of China from the enhanced tier is quite simply a glaring absence. There is now consistent cross-party consensus, reflected in previous debates in both Houses and across the intelligence community, that China poses a systemic and strategic challenge to the United Kingdom. China has targeted Members of this Parliament, launched cyberattacks on UK institutions and engaged in covert activity on British soil. In 2021, it sanctioned two Members of this House and, in 2024, the Government publicly attributed malicious cyber campaigns against MPs and the Electoral Commission to the Chinese state. These are not isolated incidents; they are part of a wider sustained pattern. Given this record, it is difficult to understand why China has not yet been put under the enhanced tier of this scheme. The Government have stated that they do not comment on individual countries, and that designations are made on a case-by-case basis. However, this is not about speculation but about providing clarity and strategic coherence in our approach to national security. The public and Parliament are entitled to understand the rationale behind such decisions, particularly when the state in question has been repeatedly named by the intelligence community as a principal source of hostile activity. Indeed, the Home Office’s own professional guidance lists Russia, Iran and China as the foremost state-based threats. The director-general of MI5 has echoed this view, as has already been said this afternoon. So why the inconsistency? What message does it send, either to those carrying out covert activities or to our international partners, when a state widely recognised as a threat is excluded from a scheme specifically designed to counter exactly this kind of behaviour? I therefore urge the Government to reconsider this decision, or at the very least to provide a clearer public explanation of their current position. On enforcement and oversight, effective implementation is vital and registration requirements must be communicated clearly. Guidance must be accessible, and enforcement must be proportionate and consistent across sectors and regions. Can the Minister confirm that the necessary resources are in place to support enforcement, and that compliance will be monitored in a structured and transparent manner? We note that Section 82 of the National Security Act 2023 requires the Secretary of State to publish an annual report on the scheme’s operation, which is welcome, but can the Minister confirm whether that report will include an assessment of the effectiveness of the current exemptions, and whether further exemptions or additional country designations are under active consideration? Finally, although this scheme is a welcome development, we must acknowledge that it is only one part of a much broader challenge. Hostile states are adapting constantly. Disinformation, cyber interference, economic coercion and influence operations now span multiple domains. Responding effectively demands not just new legal frameworks but a whole of government approach, with sustained investment in resilience, cross-sectoral co-ordination and continued international alignment. In conclusion, we support these measures, which are necessary, appropriate and overdue, but they must be implemented in a manner that is robust, proportionate and responsive to the evolving nature of state threats—not just today but in the years ahead. We remain concerned about the exclusion of China from the enhanced tier. We urge the Government to keep this matter under close and continuous review, and to act with greater transparency about the strategic direction of our national security posture.