Viscount Hailsham (Con)

My Lords, I cannot support this amendment, for two reasons. First, it imposes a regime which is wholly different from the regulatory practices in every other regulatory authority. For the last 15 years, I have practised exclusively as a legal adviser to regulatory panels, including for doctors, nurses, midwives, healthcare practitioners and social workers. In each and every case, a practitioner, a registrant, who has been acquitted by a criminal court can be brought before the regulatory panel to face misconduct proceedings. That is because the standard of proof is different: the criminal acquittal means that they failed to prove the case beyond a reasonable doubt. However, the regulatory panel is entitled to find, on the balance of probabilities, that misconduct has been made out. That takes me to the second point. Not only is it contrary to all the practices that we as a Parliament have imposed on other regulatory authorities, which I have identified, it is contrary to the merits. It may very well be that an officer who has properly been acquitted is none the less, on the balance of probabilities—the test within the regulatory authority—guilty of misconduct. I believe that that option should remain. I am very close to the position of the noble and learned Baroness, who draws from her experiences in the family courts. My experience is in regulatory proceedings, and what is proposed in this amendment is profoundly different from what we have imposed on the regulatory authorities.