Contribution
My Lords, first, I add to the widespread praise that the noble Lord, Lord Robertson of Port Ellen, General Sir Richard Barrons and Dr Hill have rightly received for leading and delivering this comprehensive and thorough strategic defence review document. It is indeed a transformational and genuinely strategic review and goes into great depth as to the purpose, intention and delivery of the defence of our nation and our interests abroad in its widest sense. Their emphasis that as a nation, and a proud one at that, we need the entire people of these islands to share, comprehend and be openly supportive of defence and all that we expect of our brave and committed Armed Forces is a point extremely well made. I also thank the Minister for taking the time to meet me yesterday prior to publication of the review. It was much appreciated.
As technological advance changes defence and our preparedness at a frightening pace, it is absolutely right that the entire country supports and has a broad understanding of what the future might hold. The review proposes some 62 recommendations, all of which the Government have accepted, and a number of which have already been in progress from the previous Administration. However, as the Secretary of State for Defence made clear in the other place, the world we live in now contains novel threats that are arguably more dangerous than we have ever faced before. As the spectre of Putin’s Russia looms over Europe’s eastern flanks, we can no longer take peace for granted. The case for transformation is both compelling and immediate.
It is in that vein that we on these Benches welcome the contents of the review: the commitments to continuing the AUKUS nuclear-powered submarine programme, to GCAP, to increasing munitions production and to stockpiling are all most positive steps. However, I have a number of concerns. The first, I am sure, will come as no surprise to the Minister: there has been much consternation as to the correct level of funding required, but it is evident that the Overton window on defence spending is shifting rapidly. We on these Benches welcome the Government’s announcement that they will increase the Ministry of Defence budget to 2.5% of GDP by 2027. However, the recommendations in the review all come with a price tag, and the authors were clear that the plan is really affordable only if and when the Government commit to 3%.
As of yet, the Government’s messaging has appeared rather mixed, to put it politely. Most confusing were the Defence Secretary’s comments this morning on “BBC Breakfast” that the Government have an ambition to reach 3% by 2034, then that he was 100% confident that 3% was achievable in the next Parliament and then that reaching 3% was predicated on economic growth. It appears that all the Government have given are vague statements that—in the fullness of time, in due course, when conditions allow and at the appropriate juncture—they may raise defence spending to the 3% required. It is surely a position that Sir Humphrey would be thrilled with, so can the Minister confirm that all the recommendations in the review can be paid for in full within the current spending limits?
That becomes even more important when we consider the recent overtures from NATO. We have seen today that the Secretary-General will strongly push member states to bolster their budgets to 3.5% annually, plus 1.5% for defence infrastructure. The Danish Prime Minister has stated that waiting until the 2030s to boost defence spending will be “too late”, and the former Chief of the General Staff, General Sir Patrick Sanders, has said that he is “really worried” that the Government are not acting fast enough on defence. Can the Minister confirm that the UK will follow NATO’s likely new targets when they are set at the Hague summit?
I have two further observations. First, there appears to be a slight lack of focus on amphibious capabilities. In fact, there are only three mentions of the word “amphibious” in the document. Given that the Government have scrapped HMS “Bulwark” and “Albion”, thereby leaving the Royal Navy with no landing platform docks and relying solely on the Bay class ships of the Royal Fleet Auxiliary, ships that themselves are ageing rapidly, can the Minister provide further clarity on the future of the UK’s amphibious capabilities?
Secondly, the Minister will not be surprised to hear that I would have hoped for further measures on the reform of the structures within the Ministry of Defence. There is no doubt in my mind, from the albeit limited time that I served there, that there is considerable scope for streamlining, updating and commercialising large components of the overall modus operandi. In my view, the MoD has outdated views and practices, particularly in the areas of risk management, the concept of change and commercial imperative, that restrict the productivity and effectiveness of such a critical and large organisation.
Page 65 of the document mentions the increasing use of AI within the MoD to enable the department to redeploy staff currently working in finance, human resources and commercial functions, thereby aiming to reduce the Civil Service costs by 10%. That is of course a positive step, although perhaps a little unambitious, but it also states that the focus should be on productivity rather than headcount. Given that the MoD civilian personnel headcount was 61,706 as of 1 April 2025, almost as large as the British Army itself, is there not a compelling case for looking at how we might streamline the Civil Service radically within the Ministry of Defence?
Further, the review calls for the creation of a number of newly formatted bodies: a defence investors’ advisory group, a defence innovation organisation and a defence research and evaluation organisation. My concern here is that these new bodies could simply add to the already intricate web of overlapping and competing organisations and agencies of the MoD, thereby confusing the structure rather than enhancing it.
As the Minister knows well, many additions are made for valid reasons, but rarely are existing structures dismantled to make way for innovation. For example, we already have the Defence Science and Technology Laboratory, which was split from the Defence Evaluation and Research Agency in 2001, with responsibilities for advanced technological research. How will the new defence innovation organisation and defence research and evaluation organisation fit in with DSTL? We must ensure that there is no duplication of functions if we are to have, as the review sets out, a policy of “one defence”. The critically creative work undertaken by DSTL needs as much freedom from interference as possible for it to flourish and deliver exception.
I have a final question for the Minister. Given the importance of the review and the significance of its recommendations, I hope the Government will provide time for a full debate on the strategic defence review to allow the House to fully consider the UK’s vital new strategy for defence. The challenge now is how to fund it in full to fulfil the hopes and expectations of the reviewers and the contributors to the limit.