Baroness Doocey (LD)

My Lords, I apologise; I thought the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, was going to speak only to his amendment, but in fact he was summing up. I should have spoken first. We have sympathy with the principles behind the amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. They would replace the current presumption of anonymity with a more flexible, case-by-case judicial test, based on real risks to safety, the public interest and open justice. These are important safeguards and they align with our long-held position. From these Benches, we continue to support a carefully balanced presumption of anonymity for firearms officers who face criminal charges, one that can be rebutted when a court considers identification essential for justice or for maintaining public confidence. The amendments from the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, would make anonymity the exception, rather than the starting point. That risks undermining the reassurance that these vital specialists need. In these thankfully rare cases, where hesitation can cost lives, we believe the balance should rest with a rebuttable presumption. It offers protection to officers acting in good faith, without compromising transparency or creating any sense of special treatment. Just as importantly, it protects their families. For me, this is a key issue. Police officers’ children should not have to face abuse at school or live in fear of vigilante threats or gang reprisals. Our approach suggests a middle way, avoiding a chilling effect on recruitment while maintaining public trust through strong judicial oversight. We are less sympathetic to Amendment 394. While armed officers face exceptional pressures, the proposed presumption against prosecution would send a damaging message that they are being judged by more forgiving standards than other citizens. That is not a principle we believe that we should endorse. Finally, we understand that the aim of Amendment 403, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Carter, is to reassure firearms officers that the law recognises the realities of split-second decision-making, but we fear that it would, in practice, create a special homicide defence available only to that group. We would rather continue to trust judges and juries to apply the existing nuanced law, which already allows for context and proportionality, than to carve out a lesser liability for one profession.