Contribution
My Lords, I thank noble Lords on all sides of the Committee who have contributed to an excellent debate. Just on the final point made by the Minister, the Government’s commitment to academic freedom and free speech and upholding them in universities was not particularly clear at the beginning of the Government’s term. Bridget Phillipson torpedoed the Higher Education (Freedom of Speech) Act within days of getting her feet under the desk and agreed only reluctantly to implement some of the clauses that were due to be implemented last year, on 1 August, thanks to a judicial review brought by the Free Speech Union.
I am not sure that the Minister responded to the very good question that my noble friend Lady Noakes asked about whether the liability of employers for third-party harassment would extend to their employees overseas.
I would like to respond in a bit of detail to the points made by the noble Baroness, Lady Carberry of Muswell Hill. One of the safeguards she mentioned against the overapplication of Clause 20 is that only an employee with the relevant protected characteristic could sue if they had been offended or upset—if they felt harassed—by virtue of that protected characteristic. But that is not quite accurate. You do not have to have the protected characteristic in question to sue your employer for failing to protect someone with that protected characteristic from being harassed, as established in the case of English v Thomas Sanderson Ltd, in which someone successfully sued their employer in the employment tribunal for not protecting a notional employee with the relevant protected characteristic, when she herself did not have that protected characteristic.
The noble Baroness also said she thought it very unlikely that an employee could sue their employer for failing to take all reasonable steps to protect them from overhearing remarks, jokes, expostulations et cetera made by customers or members of the public. But in the case of Sule v Shoosmiths in the employment tribunal, a woman did successfully sue her employer, Shoosmiths, for a conversation she overheard about immigration. She was a Nigerian lady and she overheard a conversation —not directed at her—which she found upsetting or offensive by virtue of her protected characteristic. If that woman had been employed in Downing Street and had overheard a conversation between the Prime Minister and his aides last week about the speech the Prime Minister was about to give about immigration, it may well be that she could have sued the Civil Service for not taking all reasonable steps to protect her from being harassed in that way—overhearing a conversation about immigration that she found offensive or upsetting.
If the noble Baroness, Lady Carberry, sincerely believes that Clause 20 is not intended to be invoked to ban banter, why not accept Amendment 88, which would exempt employers from being sued for indirect third-party harassment? We have heard the argument over and over again on the other side of the Committee that the amendments that my noble friends and I and other noble Lords have suggested as ways of improving the Bill and clarifying exactly what steps employers would need to take to protect their employees from third-party harassment are completely unnecessary because the clause is not intended for things such as overheard conversations—banter—to be in scope. But it seems a little naive to imagine that the clause will be applied only in ways that the Government currently intend. What about unintended consequences? The noble Baroness said that she was not anti-banter, just anti-harassment. I am anti-unintended consequences. If you want to avoid those unintended consequences materialising, these vexatious complaints being brought in the employment tribunal or eccentric decisions being made by the tribunal, why not clarify exactly what the limits of employers’ liability are by accepting some of these amendments?
The noble Lord, Lord Fox, accused me of erecting a straw man and said that I was trying to generate synthetic rage about the risks I claim arise from this clause. Well, it is not synthetic—it is real. I know this because the Free Speech Union has taken on at least five cases in which people have been silenced because of a misunderstanding about the scope of the Equality Act due to a belief that the Equality Act, as it stands, requires employers to protect their employees from third-party harassment.
The noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, mentioned that one of the likely consequences of this clause is that gender-critical feminist groups might find it difficult to book spaces in pubs and other venues for fear that trans and non-binary employees of those venues might object that merely inviting women with those views into the pub would constitute a form of harassment. That has happened three times. We have cases of gender-critical feminist groups being ejected from pubs because the managers have misunderstood what their responsibilities and legal duties are under the Equality Act. They believe that those duties extend to protecting their trans and non-binary employees from being harassed by allowing third parties to discuss views they find offensive, deeply upsetting or disagreeable.