Contribution
My Lords, with the leave of the House, I will also speak to Amendment 2. I would like to thank noble Lords for their continued interest and engagement in this important legislation. I know that some noble Lords will be disappointed to see the other place overturn the amendment inserted by your Lordships’ House, relating to the scope of the new mechanism, but I hope that I can offer some reassurance today on this matter.
As noble Lords will know, this Bill is intended to enhance the toolkit that the Bank of England has to manage the failure of a banking institution. In particular, it seeks to provide a new source of funding to cover certain costs associated with resolution and, in doing so, to strengthen the protections for the taxpayer, given the importance of protecting public funds in the event that a bank fails.
That said, I do understand the concerns that noble Lords have about any potential costs that would be placed on the banking sector if the Bill’s mechanism were used to support the resolution of some of the largest banks. Here, I would reiterate that it is the Government’s strong expectation that this mechanism would not be used to support the failure of the largest firms.
Noble Lords will recall that the Government published draft updates to its code of practice in October last year, which contained important language clarifying this expectation. I also met with many noble Lords in person during the Bill’s passage to listen carefully to concerns and to seek to explain the Government’s views on this matter.
Ultimately, the other place has taken the view that the scope of the mechanism should not be limited. The Government continue to believe that it is important to retain some flexibility for the Bank of England. I would like to make three further points to help explain that position.
First, as I have mentioned, the Government published draft updates to the code of practice to clarify our expectation that the Bank of England would bail in all readily available MREL that a bank holds, on top of the regulatory capital that must be bailed in, before using this mechanism. The Government therefore envisage that the mechanism would only be used on larger banks as a backstop, and any funds required would be only a top up to these other sources of recapitalisation.
Secondly, allowing the Bank of England the option of using the recapitalisation mechanism on larger banks means that it will be more able to respond to unexpected factors when resolving a bank. While of course the Bank of England works hard to ensure that it is fully prepared for a failure scenario, the manner in which banks fail is always highly uncertain. It is therefore important to ensure that the Bill is not overly restrictive in curtailing the Bank’s ability to use the mechanism flexibly.
As we have discussed in previous debates, there are some circumstances where retaining that flexibility could help to protect public funds. Although unlikely, there are circumstances in which larger banks may not be sufficiently capitalised to self-insure against their own failure, even if the bank in question has been directed to maintain end-state MREL requirements. An example of that might be if the firm was subject to a large redress claim, resulting in larger recapitalisation requirements than envisaged. Similarly, changes in the market value of the firm’s assets over time could result in higher losses than expected at the point of failure, again resulting in higher recapitalisation requirements to manage the failure of the firm in question.
While unlikely, those examples demonstrate a clear benefit in having the flexibility to source additional resources from the mechanism, having already written down the firm’s available MREL. Restricting the scope of the Bill would prevent the mechanism from being available in such scenarios, leaving public funds and therefore the taxpayer exposed instead. The Government therefore consider the theoretical possibility of using the recapitalisation mechanism on a larger bank a prudent step, providing comprehensive protection for public funds.
Thirdly, any levying by the Financial Services Compensation Scheme to recover funds provided to the Bank of England will be subject to an affordability cap set by the Prudential Regulation Authority, which is currently £1.5 billion per year. In line with its safety and soundness objective, the PRA carefully considers the affordability of the FSCS levy for firms, providing an important safeguard against the sector being hit by unaffordable levies to prop up the largest firms.
I hope those points will go some way to reassuring noble Lords, and that they will be able to support the Bill as it now stands. Noble Lords will note that Amendment 2 is a straightforward amendment to remove the financial privilege amendment that was inserted by this House at Third Reading. I beg to move.