Contribution
My Lords, it has been a very interesting debate. I thank those who have contributed to it all round, and I will try to mention everyone. I thought I should start by answering the question of the noble Lord, Lord Marlesford, about whether there is a difference in the insurance policy between a pet and a human being. The answer is yes, because the provisions of a standard insurance policy in the UK would present two problems for the pet. The first is a total exclusion for infestation and insects—so the sort of problems the noble Lord, Lord Trees, was talking about would be taken out straight away. Secondly, there is usually a heavy exclusion for gradually operating causes, so that would take out chewing and other things pets might do. For centuries, or at least a century and a bit, there have been policies that are aware of pet damage issues. It is not just a landlord and tenant issue; it is a first-party issue that someone might start claiming for a dog chewing a Sheraton chair. Is that a thing you can claim for on insurance—yes or no? The answer has always been no.
This is the core of the problem, which I will finish on. I did not have the good grace to speak to Amendments 284 and 285, but they are in fact good ways of getting at the very problem I have been describing. I am not sure that I have been clear enough; it is not a question of the market eventually creating something, because it is not insurance if it is inevitable. The difficulty of “first dollar in” protection for a dog chewing something is that it is inevitable that there will be a loss. It is not something that any proper underwriting manager will ever say yes to. Lots of brokers will be very interested in saying yes, because they will see premium volumes and commissions to be earned as well, but underwriting managers will not, and I am therefore extremely negative on the prospects of there ever being a comprehensive policy for a tenant to insure against their pet damaging a flat. That is why I have been concentrating on trying to find other ways of doing this—that are going to be the enabler, which I want, of pets coming into flats.
On Amendment 130, what the Minister has just said is very helpful, in that that can at least be referred to. Although people in the insurance market will carry on knocking spots off each other about the definition of “premium”, the Minister’s helpful words at the Dispatch Box will settle that issue, and we can leave Amendment 130 to one side.
Amendment 129 tries to add something currently missing from the Bill, which is a better definition of what the landlord is able to buy and give the bill to the tenant for. It seems that, at the moment, the landlord could buy £5 million-worth of cover and ask the tenant to pay for it, which would be very expensive. There is more to be discussed on that, and I hope the Minister will agree to meet with me to carry on going through these various insurance issues.
On what the Minister said about the complexities of administering an eight-week deposit versus a five-week one, the great thing about having Scotland next door to us is that we can look over the border and see how complex that has proved to be. In fact, it is perfectly easy to handle. All the various agents who are active in Scotland—the big ones, anyway—are also active in England. I assume that they already have the systems to manage this. I do not feel that the deposit system, which is so successful in Scotland, could not be applied and be successful in England and Wales.
Finishing on Amendment 127, my advice to the House is that we will not get there by having this type of insurance. It would be very unfortunate if this went on to the statute book and it was possible for a landlord to use what I have described as an Italian torpedo approach to prevent people who want to have a pet in their home from doing so, simply by asking for the impossible. Therefore, I look forward to engaging with the Minister and her excellent team again, in the hope that we can find a way forward.
In the absence of anything else, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.