Baroness Taylor of Stevenage (Lab)

I am very grateful to all noble Lords. I agree that this is a very important group, and I was sorry to see other noble Lords leaving the Chamber, because this was a very important discussion. I thank the noble Baronesses, Lady Janke and Lady Jones, and the noble Lords, Lord Hacking and Lord Best, for their amendments, and thank all noble Lords who have spoken: the noble Lords, Lord Thurlow, Lord Marlesford, Lord Jamieson and Lord Young, the noble Baroness, Lady Grender, and the noble Earl, Lord Lytton, to whose letter I have replied. It is in the post, so I have signed it off, and the noble Earl should receive it shortly. As I have stated previously, and I am going to restate it, and the Deputy Prime Minister, as the noble Lord, Lord Jamieson, said, has been very clear about this, our Government do not support rent controls. We have considered rent regulation within the broader context of the private rented sector, and we do not believe that limiting rents in this way leads to positive outcomes. Evidence suggests that so-called first- and second-generation rent controls may disadvantage tenants as well as landlords. They can have a long-term negative impact on housing supply and discourage investment in the sector, leading to declining property standards. Subtler forms of rent control—second- or third-generation rent controls—have differential impacts on different groups, typically benefiting settled and better-off tenants more than those looking for a home or needing to move. Academic studies from countries such as Sweden and Germany, and from places such as San Francisco and Ontario, show that rent controls can limit supply, discourage investment and lead to declining property standards. The noble Earl, Lord Lytton, referred to early attempts at rent controls and their impact on supply. We simply think that the answer to this is supply generally, and supply of social and affordable housing in particular, rather than putting controls on rents. The noble Lord, Lord Thurlow, was right to say that my interactions with the financial sector indicate that institutional finance is available for rental property. The noble Lord, Lord Carrington, has spoken about build to rent very powerfully; the finance is there for that. That has the potential to drive the supply that will stabilise rents over time. That is why we do not want to introduce rent controls. I will start with my noble friend Lord Hacking’s amendments—perhaps he could ask the two tenants to whom he referred to come up with a solution to the Arctic temperature in your Lordships’ Chamber this afternoon. The weather forecasts of a heatwave have been grossly exaggerated in this part of London. On Amendment 76, the Bill as presented to the Committee today seeks to remove the ability of landlords to place rent review clauses in tenancy agreements. The effect of the amendment tabled by my noble friend would be to reintroduce into the Bill a measure allowing landlords to make use of such a clause. To be specific, Amendment 76 would amend Clause 7 to allow for rent review clauses linking rent increases to inflation to be included in tenancy agreements so long as such an increase fell between 3% and 8%. Rent increases made under a rent review clause cannot be challenged at the tribunal. As such, the approach put forward by my noble friend Lord Hacking risks a significant reduction in the protection for tenants, who may not understand the effects of the rent review clause and could have limited power to negotiate these even if clearly articulated. It is likely that the use of such clauses would become standard, in effect taking us back to the status quo, where the protection the tribunal offers is available only to a small number of tenancies. Furthermore, if the use of standardised rent review clauses became commonplace, there is a risk that this would, in effect, result in a system of de facto rent control. I will not repeat again our position on rent control, but it is worth while, if the Committee will allow me, to elaborate further on why any attempt to use a single metric for calculating rent increases risks unintended consequences. The danger of such an approach is that arbitrary increases prescribed in tenancy agreements could artificially inflate the rent for some locations. For example, in Leeds, rents increased by 2% between January 2024 and January 2025, whereas in Oxford, rents increased by 12% in the same period. CPI for this 12-month period was 3%. The measures contained within the amendment would therefore likely have led to rent increases in Leeds above the market rate, to the detriment of tenants there, and the controlling of rents in Oxford, with all the associated wider issues which we have already discussed. Therefore, I am sure my noble friend can understand why the Government cannot accept an amendment which would remove the right of tenants to appeal rent increases above market rate, risk some tenants being trapped in above-market-rate rent rises, and risk the implementation of de facto rent controls. Turning to Amendments 79, 84 and 85, I join others in commending the noble Lord, Lord Best, for the clarity of his explanation and for all the work he has done as chair of the Affordable Housing Commission. This is vital work, and I sincerely understand the motivation behind his amendments: that these would limit annual rent increases during the first four years of a tenancy to a percentage calculated by reference to CPI or median national earnings over a three-year period—the noble Lord articulated his amendments much clearly than I could. If either of those things happened, a challenge to the tribunal by the tenant would not be possible. The first of the amendments from the noble Lord, Lord Best, Amendment 79, would introduce measures into Clause 7 of the Bill which, as I have just set out, would separate the setting of rents from the market rate. As such, the amendment would introduce a form of rent control, and I have already explained our position in the Government towards rent control. The regulation of rents in the form proposed by the noble Lord could have a long-term negative impact on housing supply, discourage investment and lead to declining property standards. In fact, the introduction of an in-tenancy rent control would create the risk of tenants in this country experiencing what has been seen in Ontario in Canada, where a similar form of regulation has limited the amount by which rents could increase each year for existing tenancies. For example, rental price growth in 2023 was capped at 2.5%, based on the Ontario consumer price index. Analysis suggests that the result of this measure has been higher rents for new tenants, with the impact felt by more mobile groups such as younger people, who are often new arrivals to the rental market. There is also evidence from Ontario that landlords have sought to evict tenants so that controlled rents can be reset at the market level. The risk, therefore, of causing unintended harm to tenants as well as landlords is too large for our Government to accept, even in an amendment as well-intentioned, as I know it is, as that put forward today by the noble Lord, Lord Best. Instead, as the Committee is already aware, our approach is to allow landlords to increase rents annually to the market rate, which represents a strengthening of rent regulation in the broader context of the entire system, including security of tenure, better enforcement and quality standards.