Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)

My Lords, I am grateful for that clarification from the Government Whip. On that basis I declare again that, as in the register of Members’ financial interests, I receive a rental income from my one property, which was my matrimonial home. I will speak to Amendments 16, 17 and 18. My intention is to highlight an important principle that this legislation seems to violate. The amendments in this group are underpinned by the Bill’s retroactivity. I seek to probe the Government’s use of retroactive provisions, and I urge them to reaffirm from the Dispatch Box their commitment to prospective lawmaking. Retrospective legislation is generally defined as legislation which “takes away or impairs any vested right acquired under existing laws, or creates a new obligation, or imposes a new duty or attaches a new disability in respect to transactions or considerations already passed”. The Oxford Dictionary of Law defines retroactive legislation as: “Legislation that operates on matters taking place before its enactment, e.g. by penalizing conduct that was lawful when it occurred. There is a presumption that statutes are not intended to have retroactive effect unless they merely change legal procedure”. Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary of Words and Phrases—a tome that I am sure we are all familiar with—defines it in Latin as: “Nova constitutio futuris formam imponere debet, non praeteritis”. That is, unless there be clear words to the contrary, statutes do not apply to a past but to a future state or circumstance. The general approach to retrospective legislation was summarised by the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, in the Supreme Court case of Walker v Innospec Ltd and others in 2017, where he said: “The general rule, applicable in most modern legal systems, is that legislative changes apply prospectively. Under English law, for example, unless a contrary intention appears, an enactment is presumed not to be intended to have retrospective effect. The logic behind this principle is explained in Bennion on Statutory Interpretation, 6th ed (2013), Comment on Code section 97: ‘If we do something today, we feel that the law applying to it should be the law in force today, not tomorrow’s backward adjustment of it’”. Retrospective legislation may also be challenged under Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights, because such legislation will only be compliant with convention rights where there are “compelling grounds of the general interest”— that comment was made in the case of Zielinski, Gonzalez and others v France 1998—or where such legislation seeks to remedy existing defective legislation. The principle of non-retroactivity is a fundamental concept within the civil law system that ensures the stability and predictability of legal relations. It refers to the restriction placed on the application of new legislation to actions or events that have occurred prior to the law’s enactment. Essentially, this principle serves as a safeguard for individuals, protecting their existing rights and expectations from being unexpectedly altered by future legislative changes. Non-retroactivity is rooted in several key rationales. It reflects the belief that individuals should be able to rely on the legal framework in place at the time they act. If laws were to apply retrospectively, it could lead to confusion and insecurity, undermining the rule of law and fairness. That is the basis on which I move my Amendment 16 and speak to my Amendments 17 and 18. In many jurisdictions, this principle is codified within civil codes or specific statutes. For instance, the French civil code explicitly states that a law cannot have retroactive effects unless otherwise specified. Similarly, the German Basic Law incorporates this principle, which serves as a safeguard against potential abuses of legal reforms by ensuring that new laws do not adversely affect established rights and obligations. Internationally, treaties and conventions also reflect the doctrine of non-retroactivity. The European Convention on Human Rights articulates the necessity of legal certainty and protection of rights, endorsing the notion that individuals must be aware of the legal consequences of their actions at a given point in time. The UN’s International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights further emphasises that no one shall be subjected to retroactive penal laws, further demonstrating the widespread acceptance of this principle. I accept that there are some notable exceptions to the English legal system setting its face against retroactivity. One such case, perhaps the most notable, is of course the War Crimes Act 1991. If legislation is aimed at, for instance, protecting public safety or welfare, such as in scenarios where a retroactive law serves to enhance public health standards or address urgent safety concerns, the legal system may justify its application to prior situation. Courts often assess the implications of such laws on individual rights, weighing the benefits to society as a whole against potential infringements on personal freedoms. Another example in this context is the landmark case of the European Court of Human Rights ruling in Hirst v the United Kingdom about prisoner voting rights, where the court emphasised that legislative changes should not detrimentally affect individuals who were previously adjudicated under earlier laws. In this instance, the court reinforced the significance of respecting established legal positions, thereby underscoring the essence of non-retroactivity.