Contribution
My Lords, I hope noble Lords will agree that in my speeches so far this evening I have been as brief as possible. This amendment is of some technicality and legally quite complex. Not being a lawyer, I hope that I can get it right and explain it correctly in as brief a compass as possible, but if I go on a little bit longer than I have otherwise, I hope noble Lords will indulge me.
I will start at some distance from the Bill, with European Union procurement law, to which we were subject for so many years. Anybody involved in local government or any departmental procurement will remember that it obliged us to put out to tender any contracts that were above a certain threshold. We had to advertise them and go through what was known as the OJEU process.
At that time in European law, a question arose: what was the situation of a public authority which had set up its own company? Could it award work to a company which was its own subsidiary, without going out to tender? This case, which was called Teckal, went to the European Court of Justice, which determined that in certain circumstances, especially those in which the subsidiary was doing substantially most of its work for the public authority, contracts could be awarded to it without the need for any tendering. So, you have a public authority which has a subsidiary, the subsidiary does most of its work for that public authority, and contracts can be awarded without going out to tender—the Teckal exemption.
Of course, we left the European Union and in the course of time we replaced that procurement legislation with our own Procurement Act, seen so ably through the House, if I may so, by my noble friend Lady Neville- Rolfe. That procurement legislation carried forward the provisions of the Teckal exemption—I do not know whether it is still called that but I am going to call it that because everybody in the procurement universe does—so that the situation I described still pertains in UK law.
The Bill offers to local transport authorities three ways of carrying forward the provision of bus services: through an enhanced bus partnership, through the franchising route, or through establishing their own bus company subsidiary. It is manifest to me, even as a non-lawyer, that a bus company that was established and owned by a local transport authority, which inevitably would provide practically all its services to that local transport authority, would qualify for the Teckal exemption —that is, work would be given to it without going out to tender. I am going to park that for a moment.
Let us now travel to a different part of the Bill, relating to the franchising route. Permission is given to local transport authorities to make initially what is called a “direct award”, which is to give to the existing incumbent bus company the contract to carry out the franchised service without going out to tender. This provision would apply for only a limited period. One understands the Government’s thinking on this: if you are going to adopt a franchise model and you have only one bus company operating, then perhaps you should be able to give it to that company for the sake of continuity and smooth operation and then develop the market later, so that when you next arrange your franchising there is a market into which you can tender. The direct award route is not in itself objectionable— I am not saying that anything in this is objectionable.
I come to the interaction of the two, because the anxiety is that the legislation is so drafted—not deliberately, I imagine, but I will come to that—that it may be possible for a local authority on the one hand to use the route of setting up its own subsidiary bus company: a so-called LABCo, which seems to be the terminology that is going round; I depreciate it as much as I think the Minister does, from the shaking of his head. On the other hand, a local authority could then use the direct award mechanism to give the whole contract to its own subsidiary immediately and without any tendering.
I think the Minister can respond to what I have said by saying one of three things. Fortunately for him, I have given him my own inadequate explanation of this case in advance, so he has had some time to think about it. He can say that I have got the law wrong—he has the benefit of the Government Legal Department behind him, and I have my poor resources, so that may be the answer. He will be able to explain why I have got the law wrong and put the House right as to what the legal position is. That is one thing. He could say that I have alighted upon a loophole and a weakness in the legislation which should be addressed, that he is going to take steps to address it, that my amendment is therefore unnecessary and that something will be done between now and Third Reading. Or he could say words to the effect that I have got the law right, the loophole exists, and he is going to do nothing at all about it. In the last case, I give notice that I suspect I would want to the test the opinion of the House, but in the first two cases, if I was corrected on the law or if the Minister said that he agreed with me on the law and was going to do something about it, then I would of course expect to withdraw my amendment.
I am very interested to hear what noble Lords have to say about this exciting argument that could, for all I know, provoke widespread debate in the House, but I am particularly interested to know what the Minister has to say when he comes to reply. I beg to move.