Lord Coaker (Lab)

I understand that, and I will come to the “no notice” point in a moment. I was simply pointing out to the Committee that, as the Bill stands, new Section 340IB(3) states: “If the Commissioner proposes to exercise the power under subsection (1), the Commissioner must give the Secretary of State notice”. The expectation is that the Secretary of State would then tell the commanding officer; however, sites can be excluded on national security grounds because a list will have been drawn up. But new Section 340IB(4) states: “Subsection (3) does not apply, so far as relating to service premises in the United Kingdom”— this goes to the point the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, made— “if the Commissioner considers that giving notice would defeat the object of exercising the power”. As I say, in all this there is a balance to be struck between notifying the Secretary of State; the Secretary of State notifying the commissioner; the ability, however, to have “no notice” visits; and alongside that protecting national security and indeed personal safety. The noble and gallant Lord made the important point that you might want to protect an entire base or facility, and perhaps everyone would be more open to understanding why that base is excluded. But he also pointed out that it may be a question of protecting just part of the base, and even a commanding officer might not know some of the things going on there. So he raises an issue which we will need to come back to between Committee and Report, because it is important and we need to consider it. I hope that, in addressing the issues and pointing out the various pathways to a visit by the commissioner—or not—I have shown that we are trying to balance the various demands in order to make the commissioner’s visits effective, to maintain national security, and to give no notice where appropriate, while being fair to the bases being visited. I have tried to answer noble Lords’ specific questions, and I hope that those remarks are helpful. I will just read the formal points into the record, because I think that is helpful. On Amendments 13, 14 and 15 and the commissioner’s power of access to service premises, I thank again the noble Baroness for her characteristically thoughtful consideration of this issue, and indeed I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, and the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup. As we have just seen, one of the challenges when drafting the Bill was ensuring that the correct balance was struck between the independence and power of the Armed Forces commissioner on one hand, and the power of the Secretary of State, notably to protect the interests of national security and the safety of individuals, on the other. Although the commissioner has the power to enter service premises and prepare independent reports and recommendations, this is balanced with the Secretary of State’s ability to prevent the exercise of these powers in the interests of national security and personal safety, thus ensuring proper and responsible regard to delicate security issues surrounding defence premises. We believe that the Bill achieves this balance, and that to provide more prescriptive restrictions, such as the ones contained in the proposed amendments, may risk offsetting it. We must also remember that much of the commissioner’s remit as set out in Clause 4 is solely focused on the general welfare of service persons and their families. The exercise of these powers can only be in pursuit of this issue. It is important that we keep that in mind when considering the role of the Secretary of State in restricting their powers. In its current form, the Bill grants the commissioner discretion as to how much notice to give service premises ahead of the commissioner’s proposed visit. This could be within seven days, as the noble Baroness suggests, or indeed longer, and we anticipate that that will be the case for the vast majority of the time. Creating a legal obligation on the Secretary of State to notify the commanding officer of each service premises that the commissioner has given notice of a proposed visit could risk creating a substantial administrative burden on the Secretary of State. It could also prove to be complex, given the multitude of service premises and personnel involved. This additional requirement could frustrate and delay the commissioner, making it harder for them to fulfil one of the most crucial elements of their role: to meet with our Armed Forces and their families in a timely way and to understand the realities of service life. However, we would expect the Secretary of State’s office to inform the relevant commanding officer when they are informed of an impending visit, as I mentioned to the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup. Further, in its current form, the Bill deliberately provides that it is up to the judgment of the commissioner as to when giving notice would defeat the object of exercising their power of entry to service premises. Removing this and replacing it with two prescriptive circumstances when the commissioner would be able to conduct no-notice visits risks inadvertently precluding circumstances when no-notice visits would be appropriate. Furthermore, to place a legal obligation on the commissioner to inform the Secretary of State of all instances where and reasons for which they have exercised their discretion not to give notice of planned entry to a service premise would, again, add an administrative burden and could significantly infringe upon their independence. However, I appreciate the noble Baroness’s concern that it would appear difficult for the Secretary of State to prevent the exercise of powers under subsection (1) of new Section 340IB, proposed by Clause 4(2) of the Bill, on national security grounds should the commissioner decide that a no-notice visit was appropriate. I assure the noble Baroness that we are working closely with partners in defence and across government to understand areas where the Secretary of State—and, where appropriate, the Foreign or Home Secretary—may wish pre-emptively to exercise the restriction power. For example, as the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup, said, access to certain parts of sites or the ability to take documents from certain terminals may be restricted. Given its sensitive nature, any such list will be a classified document; however, the sites in question and the commissioner would be aware of this in advance. We will continue to engage with the relevant agencies during implementation. This will be accompanied by a communication and engagement campaign across defence to ensure that sites and personnel are aware of the commissioner and their remit. However, should the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, and the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup, find it useful, I would welcome meetings with them to discuss this and other matters of national security in relation to the commissioner; that is an open invite to other noble Lords, should they also wish to attend. I hope that this provides the necessary reassurance to the noble Baroness. On these grounds, I ask her to withdraw her amendment.