Ben Lake

The hon. Gentleman has got to the nub of the matter. That is precisely the effect of the change implemented in 2014. It has devastated the number of successful applications for compensation, because if we consider the data for the period between 1999 and 2024, we can see that, prior to the introduction of the new section 133 test, 45.6% of applicants received compensation for their wrongful convictions, but, following its introduction, just 6.6% of cases were successful—a drop of 39 percentage points. This new test has virtually put a stop to compensation payouts for these kinds of miscarriages of justice—an insurmountable hurdle indeed. Members may wonder about the purpose of restricting eligibility in this way, and I am sure we will hear arguments that it was done to prevent those exonerated on a technicality from receiving compensation, but the cynic in me fears that the restriction was introduced to cut costs. Prior to 2014, the Ministry of Justice made average annual payouts of £5.9 million. Following the change, we have seen the average annual payouts under the scheme drop by 95%, to an average of £297,000. Even successful applicants have seen their individual compensation payments fall, with the average pre-2014 payment totalling just over £267,000, falling to an average of £61,000 after the change. I am reminded of Cicero’s teachings, over two millennia ago: “Justice looks for no prize and no price; it is sought for itself”. He also said, of course: “The worst kind of injustice is to look for profit from injustice.” It is for others to consider whether anyone profits from this injustice, but the savings that the 2014 test realises for the Ministry of Justice perhaps offer an answer to that age-old question of, “What price do we put on justice?” Well, I can tell you, Mr Turner: it is around £5.6 million a year on average, compared with the pre-2014 payments. The current system therefore places an almost impossible burden on the applicant—one whereby they are required to find a new fact that shows beyond reasonable doubt that they did not commit the offence for which they have been acquitted. The perverse situation into The perverse situation into which the 2014 change forces the wrongly convicted can be summarised as follows: they are required to prove that they are innocent of a crime for which they have already been exonerated. I appreciate that this is an academic point, but it is worth considering whether some high-profile exonerees—the Cardiff Three, the Guildford Four and the Birmingham Six—would receive compensation if they applied under the scheme today. To the layman, it is difficult to understand how such a situation is compatible with the principles underpinning our justice system, because it undermines the well-understood principle that we are all innocent until proven guilty. I know there might be a challenge to that assertion, but the fact remains that the current rules place the obligation on the defendant to prove that they did not commit a crime to the criminal standard of proof, which is beyond reasonable doubt. In Mr Buckle’s rejection letter, the Ministry of Justice, as well as reassuring him that his case had been carefully considered, asserted that, despite rejection of his claim for compensation, he is still presumed to be, and remains, innocent of the charges brought against him. If you were ever looking for a definition of Orwellian doublespeak, Mr Turner, that response is a perfect example. It illustrates how the 2014 change, by reversing the burden of proof, undermines the presumption of innocence and forces the Ministry to perform quite impressive but legally illogical linguistic gymnastics. For if Mr Buckle is in law presumed to be innocent, surely he must be treated as such by the state. A man presumed to be innocent who has spent more than five years in jail should be compensated. If the state wants to treat him as though he were a guilty man and deny him compensation, why should the burden not fall on to the state to prove his guilt? Claims by the Ministry of Justice—