Ben Lake

I am grateful for the additional time to conclude the debate. Prior to the Divisions, I was reiterating the perversity of the situation that the 2014 change has forced the wrongly convicted into. It can be summarised as follows: they are required to prove that they are innocent of a crime of which they have already been exonerated. To the layman, it is difficult to understand how such a situation is compatible with the principles that underpin our criminal justice system, for it undermines the well-understood principle that we are all innocent until proven guilty. I know that this can be challenged in practice, but the fact remains that the current compensation rules place the obligation on the defendant to prove that they did not commit a crime—a crime, of course, of which they have already been acquitted to the criminal standard of proof, which is beyond all reasonable doubt. Let me return to the case of my constituent Mr Buckle. In its rejection letter, the Ministry of Justice, as well as reassuring him that his case had been carefully considered, asserted that, despite rejecting his claim for compensation, he is still presumed to be and remains innocent of the charges brought against him. If we were ever looking for a definition of Orwellian doublespeak, this response is a perfect example. It illustrates the way in which, by reversing the burden of proof, the 2014 change undermines the presumption of innocence and forces the Ministry to perform quite impressive, but illogical, linguistic gymnastics. For if Mr Buckle is presumed to be innocent in law, he must be treated as such by the state. A man presumed to be innocent, who has spent more than five years in jail, should be compensated; if the state wants to treat him as though he were a guilty man, and deny him that compensation, why should the burden of proving his guilt not fall on the state? The Ministry’s claims that Mr Buckle is still presumed to be, and remains, innocent of the charges brought against him ring rather hollow when he is also denied a single penny in redress. It is clearly an affront to justice that the eligibility test prevents those who have been wrongly convicted from enjoying the full and unconditional benefits of being presumed innocent. There is a growing acceptance of the need for action on this matter. Sadly, the list of miscarriages of justice that have perhaps not received as much media attention, but which are just as deserving of compensation, grows ever longer. I could mention cases such as that of Sam Hallam, who was imprisoned for seven years; Victor Nealon, who was imprisoned for 17 years; or Oliver Campbell, who spent 11 years in prison and a total of 34 years fighting to clear his name. All have suffered unimaginable harm as a consequence of their wrongful convictions and, just like my constituent Mr Buckle, deserve justice. The new UK Government have an opportunity to provide it, and I urge them to address this injustice without delay. I know that the Minister will agree with the principle that the state should compensate those who have wrongly been deprived of their liberty by the state, and I would welcome confirmation from her that this is the Government’s position. The Law Commission is consulting on reform to the law governing criminal appeals, because it, too, acknowledges that the current state of affairs is completely unfair. The Law Commission’s intervention is to be welcomed, in so far as it acknowledges the unfairness of the current position of the wrongly convicted. In its consultation, the commission suggests that, if the burden is to fall on an accused to prove innocence to obtain compensation, it should be to the civil standard, rather than the criminal standard, as is the position in every other situation in a criminal case where the evidential burden shifts to the defence. That would bring things into line with the normal state of affairs. Will the Minister offer the Government’s position on the Law Commission’s proposal? Would the Government accept such a recommendation? If they are minded to accept, will they ensure that the recommendation is applied retrospectively to those wrongfully convicted since 13 March 2014? Although I cautiously welcome to the intervention of the Law Commission, and agree that it would make the current situation fairer, it still does not explain why someone presumed innocent has a further obligation or burden to prove it, nor would it address the failings made by the scheme in determining Mr Buckle’s application for compensation, or prevent other claims from being rejected after similar careful consideration. If the Government maintain that it is necessary for a person presumed innocent to prove it to receive compensation, I do not believe the appropriate authority to make that decision is an official at the Ministry of Justice, someone who, through no fault of their own, will be unfamiliar with the facts of the case and will not have witnessed the evidence given under oath, but who instead must work solely from the papers. Such an individual is not best placed to decide on such applications. Surely it is the trial jury that is best placed to decide whether the evidence proved Mr Buckle—in this case—to be both not guilty and innocent. I request that the Minister meets us to discuss the handling of Mr Buckle’s specific application and also the merits of amending the law to allow a judge to ask the trial jury, in circumstances where they have acquitted the defendant on all charges, to consider also whether they are satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the defendant is innocent of those same charges. If it is the Government’s intention to ensure that true victims of miscarriages of justice are fairly compensated, asking the trial jury to make the decision must be the fairest way. It is difficult to see any rational argument against it. I ask the Minister to be kind enough to agree to a meeting to discuss how we can ensure that Mr Buckle is granted that opportunity, so that this miscarriage of justice and the ordeal that he and his family have endured is finally brought to an end. Urgency is key, because justice delayed is justice denied.