Contribution
My Lords, it is a privilege to add my name to this amendment. I am not going to venture into the world of football, coming from the nation from which I do. But I want to draw on my experience of dispute resolution, where I have spent most of my life.
I do not need to add to what has been said about two of the essentials of dispute resolution criteria: principles and evidence. That has been done by the noble Lords, Lord Burns and Lord Birt. I will make five points, drawn from my experience and that of many others, about a dispute resolution process.
First, and most important, is the examination of the subject matter of the dispute that will arise if there is no settlement. If one looks at what is in the Bill and the process that has been selected, I accept that it is seen to work in the context in which it is used for settling a baseball player’s salary, a tariff rate or some kind of price or rate, but it is not fit for the purpose of what this is designed to deal with, which is a careful, calibrated and, above all, fair evaluation of the distribution of substantial sums of money. Everyone has said so far that this has to be fair and careful; the final offer resolution system used in the context I described does not do that.
Secondly, experience has shown that the best panel for dispute resolution is where one party chooses one arbitrator, another party chooses the other arbitrator or member of the panel, and the experienced lawyer chairs it. There are two reasons for that. First, the ability of a party to appoint gives that party confidence in the tribunal—it is constituted by that party’s assent. Secondly, I fear that there may be a misapprehension as to the role of a lawyer. The point of having a lawyer as chair is that he is experienced in guiding a dispute resolution process; it is not legalistic, though some may think so. I can assure noble Lords that if you have a highly contested dispute overseen by someone without experience—as I regret is likely to be the case if one gets to dispute resolution in this—disaster ensues.
Thirdly, it is important to bear in mind one other point. Even if after expert mediation you cannot reach a resolution that is acceptable to both, you must recall that there will be a loser and a winner; and the loser has to live, in this particular context, in a good long-term relationship with the victor. That is particularly important where the dispute is not the price of something, or who is right and who is wrong, but what is a fair distribution. For a decision to be seen as fair by the loser, which is particularly important if you are a decision-maker because you want the loser to feel he has had a fair process, the panel must be able to reach its own independent judgment and not be bound by one or other of the offers that are on the table; and ex hypothesi, it will be the offer of the winner that has triumphed, and that will not be seen as fair.
Fourthly, experience of businesses where there is outside investment shows how important it is for a dispute resolution process that affects the business to be seen—and it is perception here that matters—to be based on a fair process and the independent judgment of the panel that resolves the dispute, and not the kind of Russian roulette process, as I think it has been described, in the Bill. Applying that experience, it seems to me that the procedure for dispute resolution, in the context we are talking about, will encourage investment.
Finally, there must be a safeguard. The Bill has a safeguard in one sense: there are the procedures in Clause 81 and 82 and Schedule 10 for a review. However, what this amendment has is a fine-tuned procedure, which is must more precise and very limited.
It seems to me that, if you look at those five highlighted points, the only conclusion you can come to is that the procedure in the Bill as a matter of dispute resolution is not fit for purpose, whereas that which is in the amendment is.