James MacCleary

I thank the Backbench Business Committee for selecting this topic and the Chair of the Defence Committee for securing this debate. The UK spent £62.2 billion on defence this year. The Government plan to raise that to £73.5 billion by 2028-29. It is a significant sum. But let us be honest about what that actually shows because some of the detail deserves a great deal more explanation than the Government have so far provided. Take the day-to-day spending figures. Investment spending has increased by £10.8 billion, a rise of nearly 23%. That sounds like a lot, but the single largest driver of that increase is a £9 billion jump in depreciation and impairment costs, described only as a “non-routine accounting adjustment.” That £9 billion is the largest single movement in the MOD budget, and the Government have provided no detail whatever on what that really is. I am afraid that is not good enough. When the Minister responds, I hope that he will shed some light on what that adjustment actually represents, because the public, and this House, deserve to know. On capital spending, the increase is a more modest 0.3%, just £63.7 million. Yet within that is a reduction in funding for single-use military equipment. At a time when Ukraine has taught us the vital importance of munitions stockpiles and consumable kit, cutting that line is a curious choice, so I would again welcome a clarification from the Minister. We also keep hearing, as we have several times today, about the defence investment plan—the document that was meant to be published last autumn. Autumn came and went. We are now in March 2026, and it is still nowhere to be seen. The Government have made the plan the centrepiece of their defence modernisation narrative, and every time we ask hard questions about procurement, capability gaps or industrial strategy, we are told to wait for the DIP. But the DIP never arrives. I sometimes wonder if the DIP was part of some mass hallucination that we all had last year.