Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)

My Lords, I offer my congratulations to the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller, on restoring some sanity. But time is limited, so plaudits are postponed. Instead, let me raise my reservations. I am especially disappointed at the replication of existing rules on bullying and harassment, which are unfairly lumped in with sexual misconduct. What is more, all three are singled out as especially egregious, as we have heard. We are left with definitions of bullying and harassment that are unduly subjective, explicitly based on the perception of the person experiencing the conduct. That conduct can be one unintended isolated incident that may be “hidden or insidious”. Surely, we can see the dangers of such vagueness in the potential for inciting unjust accusations. For example, “a person may also be harassed even if they were not the intended ‘target’ of harassment”. This perversely creates a non-victim victim and facilitates weaponising accusations in bad faith—accusations impossible to disprove. Am I being paranoid? Sadly, many of our public institutions, from universities to the Civil Service, are littered with recent examples of individuals accused and disciplined for bullying or harassment, based on offence taken to words or opinions due to the feelings of victims. But, subsequently, it has been revealed by appeals or employment tribunals that the allegations themselves—the very disciplinary processes—were the real perpetrators of bullying and harassment. Employers have been forced to apologise and pay damages, but this redress is not open to those found guilty by this code. I am glad the committee concedes “the significant toll that investigations can have on members”. So often, the process is indeed the punishment, as is evidenced by the hell to which those such as fully exonerated Professor Jo Phoenix or the Buckingham University vice-chancellor James Tooley can testify. When the committee concludes that a minor-case procedure can now be used—guess what?—bullying and harassment are excluded from the proportionate response. Why? It is implied it is related to power imbalances. Interestingly, in the definition of bullying, we are told that power can equate to coercion through fear of intimidation. Fair point. But can we acknowledge that we live in a society that valorises victimhood—a cancel culture that promiscuously demonises others by labelling them as bullies and harassers? As such, the real power can reside in the hands of would-be accusers, because even the threat of an allegation of bullying can be career or reputation destroying. It is certainly intimidating—I am not even sure about saying this here, to be honest. I am not sure that denying the accuser the right to cross-examine their accuser helps, so I do have some sympathy with the amendment from the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham. Finally, the review deals intelligently with the distinction between parliamentary and non-parliamentary conduct and the need to ensure that expression of views and opinions falls outside the code’s remit. But there seems a fudge on social media, as we have heard. I am worried about the recommendations that text should be written that will state in terms what activity on social media may be dubbed parliamentary. What will that text say? This, combined with the way that definitions of bullying and harassment include that both can happen online via social media, means that, as the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth, has indicated, this could be a Trojan horse for dragging public non-parliamentary speech into scope. Can the noble Baroness offer reassurances that this is not the case? I am asking for a friend, of course.