Contribution
My Lords, I rise to speak to my Amendments 3, 5, 14, 15 and 16, which are supported by my noble friend Lord Effingham. With your Lordships’ permission, I will deal with them more logically than numerically, because they form a sort of logical suite.
The dramatic thing at the heart of the Bill is the possibility of the extension of franchising to all local transport authorities without any need for permission from the Secretary of State. It is true that other models are available, but enhanced bus partnerships already exist and simply making them a little more enhanced—although that might be valuable or lead to some sort of change—is not a dramatic intervention. As for the creation of municipal bus companies, that would be dramatic, but it is not what we are focusing on today. This group of amendments—mine in particular, but the whole group—is focused particularly on franchising, which occupies a large part of the text of the Bill, and understandably so because of the importance of it.
Yet I come back to this question all the time: why do the Government believe that franchising is a model—admittedly, one they are not imposing on any LTA; of course, I grant that—that they are willing to see any LTA, possibly every LTA in the country, adopt without any supervision, by-your-leave or check on the part of the Secretary of State? It is perfectly possible that as this Bill becomes law every LTA in the country goes for a franchising model. I am not saying that is going to happen, but theoretically it could, and nothing would prevent it.
So, the question we come back to, and this is what Amendment 3 is related to, is: why franchising? At the heart of franchising is the notion that a single controlling brain—yes, we are back to similar language to that which we used in relation to the railways Bill that we had before Christmas, but I do not apologise for that because a similar form of thinking is going on in this case—can produce a better service, a more rational service and a more socially friendly service than competition generated by the private sector in response to demand. There are arguments of course on both sides. This argument has been going on, as I think I mentioned in the railways Bill, since at least the 1920s. Our first attempts, or rather our success, in this country at regulating bus services go back to the 1920s with the establishment of the traffic commissioners. After they were established, their permission was needed, up until the 1980s, for any private company to run a bus service. They had to agree the routes and the fares. So we had a single controlling brain, and we went for a privatisation model from the 1980s, but the Government have simply failed to produce any evidence that this is a model that will work in all these LTAs and at a cost that the LTAs can afford without the subsidies that, notably, the Government are not promising.
When we ask for evidence, we are constantly pointed simply to Manchester and Cornwall. The noble Lord, Lord Goddard of Stockport, has of course given an eloquent explanation of how successful that model has been in Manchester, and I do not deny that success. It is possible that other noble Lords with roots in Cornwall will want to explain why the model has been such a success there—I do not know—but that is a very slender evidence base, if we are talking about all the LTAs in the country.
Amendment 3, therefore, is a probing amendment. It allows any private bus company to operate a service without a permit and it goes to the heart of the notion—it strikes a dagger at the heart of the notion—that a single controlling brain is necessary for good public service. It would wreck the franchising model that the Government propose—I admit that frankly—but its purpose today is to give the Government an opportunity to explain more fully why they think it is a perfectly acceptable outcome that franchising should be potentially adopted by every LTA in the country, without any regard to their experience, the size of the local transport authority or any other factor that might differentiate them significantly from Manchester and Cornwall.
With Amendment 15, I come to another point. Let us assume that franchising is okay and the case for it has been made—it has not, but let us assume that and move on, so to speak, logically. The amendment says that, before it embarks on an assessment for introducing franchising, the LTA must set out clear objectives as to what it is trying to achieve. At the moment, the Bill does not require it to do so; it is perfectly possible to embark on a franchising model without setting out for the public or for stakeholders what could be achieved and what is intended to be achieved, as well as what alternative structures and approaches might achieve the same objectives. The amendment would be a genuine improvement to the working of this proposed model because it would bring clarity right at the outset.
To move on in what is, I hope, a fairly logical order, Amendment 5 asks for data on performance and passenger numbers to be collected on a standardised basis across LTAs to tell us what subsidy is being expended per passenger in the operation of the franchising model—should they choose to take it up, of course. They might not do so, I grant you; we have discussed that already. The amendment would also require the setting out of the criteria that the auditors—I am calling them “auditors” while appreciating that the name may change as the pool of resource understandably widens—are to use when assessing the plan put forward by the local transport authority. Again, I think that those two things would be really helpful. We will want that data, and we will want to know that the auditors will be applying clear criteria standardised across the country—not the sole criteria that they will be applying but some criteria that will probably be nationally applicable. Those should be set out by the Government.
That brings us to Amendment 14, which takes us on to the point where the franchising model has been established. The franchise is running, but it is not working. In this Bill, there is no step-in power on the part of the Secretary of State in circumstances where bus services are manifestly deteriorating rather than improving as a result of introducing a franchising model. When this point was tangentially made at Second Reading—I think it was then; it cannot have been anywhere else—the Minister said that, because I had spent a long time in local government, I should somehow stick up for the autonomy of local government. I am perfectly happy to do that up to a point but, at the point at which services are manifestly deteriorating, there should be a power for the Secretary of State to step in. It exists in other respects with local authorities generally. We should have something of that order so that passengers and users of bus services can be protected. I would like to hear why the Minister thinks that that is wholly inappropriate, except on rather histrionic grounds around the autonomy of local government and principles of that character.
Finally, Amendment 16 is intended to provide a degree of stability in the local bus market in the event that a franchising assessment has taken place and been audited but, as a result of the audit, either it has been found wanting or the local transport authority has none the less decided not to proceed for whatever reason. At the moment, there is no limitation on the local transport authority starting the whole process again, if it chooses to do so, almost immediately. If that were the case, why would any private bus company continue to invest in or improve services if the axe, so to speak, could be dropped on it at any moment—that is, with them having gone through a process where they were told that they could carry on but the axe then being dropped again? Amendment 16 would put in a five-year ban on local transport authorities recommencing that assessment process to give some stability to the bus operator or operators in their area.
All these amendments, except for Amendment 3, which I admit is completely probing and would seriously damage the Bill, are good, sensible, practical ways of improving the franchising model that the Government are advancing with such enthusiasm. I very much hope that other Members of the Committee and, indeed, the Minister might want to say that they could support them.