Contribution
I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Brady, and the noble Lord, Lord Markham, for tabling these amendments. I recognise that the intent of the amendments in this group is to ensure that decisions related to the distribution backstop are appealable and subject to a merit standard of appeal, rather than being based on judicial review principles. I understand that this comes from a belief that a merit standard of appeal is necessarily preferable because it would allow the Competition Appeal Tribunal to opine on the merits of the case, rather than just on whether the correct procedure was followed, and thereby arguably offers better protections for affected parties. In this instance, I do not believe that this is the right process.
In truth, it means that a tribunal, which most likely has less technical expertise and background knowledge of the specific issues surrounding financial distribution in football than the regulator, will be able to substitute its own decision for that of the regulator’s. For example, if the regulator were to choose one of the two proposals as part of the backstop process, and make an order imposing that distribution arrangement, the Competition Appeal Tribunal could overrule this and choose the other proposal. Indeed, if we consider how this would most likely play out, the aggrieved competition organiser whose proposal is not selected would be very likely to lodge an appeal regardless.
These amendments would be tantamount to making the Competition Appeal Tribunal the ultimate deciding authority on the financial distribution arrangement in football. This would, in effect, mean cutting out the middleman and having the courts decide how much money should flow down the football pyramid. It is unclear to me why noble Lords, or indeed anyone, would think a court making this decision a better option, rather than the expert panel of the independent football regulator, or why this would necessarily lead to a more robust, more favourable or fairer outcome. It is simply the case that there are certain decisions better suited to certain standards of review.
We have engaged with legal experts and senior members of tribunals while developing the Bill. They agreed that the courts are not necessarily well placed to substitute the decisions of expert regulators on matters of technical regulatory judgment, and that a judicial review standard of appeal would be more appropriate for those types of decisions. This is also a common approach taken across other regulators. For example, the majority of decisions made by Ofcom are subject to appeal on judicial review standards.
By contrast, some of the possible enforcement decisions that the regulator can take under the Bill represent highly punitive actions. For these highly punitive, less technical and less market-specific enforcement decisions, a merits appeal is more appropriate. For example, we are of the view that courts are far better placed to opine on whether the severity of a punishment is appropriate to the infringement than on whether a certain distribution of revenue is better for the financial sustainability of English football. Ultimately, an appeals process should provide the appropriate opportunity to challenge whether a regulator is acting fairly and within its statutory remit. It should also be a focused and efficient process that does not excessively delay the final resolution of decisions or hinder the regulator in achieving its objectives.
While providing effective assurance of the regulator’s decision-making process and judgment, the appeals system should not unduly undermine the expert independent regulator. The Bill effectively balances these different considerations, including through the standard of appeal. The amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Brady, would also make every decision under Clauses 62 and 63 reviewable, subject to the statutory route of appeal to the Competition Appeal Tribunal. This includes minor and operational decisions such as the giving of notice or extending the period to submit proposals. For the same reasons I have already outlined—balancing fairness, efficiency and appropriate deference to the regulator—we do not believe this is necessary and it is not the approach we have taken in the Bill.
Amendment 326 would be contrary to Amendments 322, 324 and 325. The Competition Appeal Tribunal could not simultaneously review a decision on judicial review principles and on the merits. On Amendments 333, 334 and 335, as I have set out, we disagree with the intention to make every decision under Clauses 62 and 63 a reviewable decision on the merits. However, if that were the intention, additions to the consequential amendments of other Acts, or the Competition Appeal Tribunal rules, certainly would not be the way to do it. For these reasons, I cannot accept the amendments and I hope that noble Lords will not press them.