Lord Moynihan (Con)

The noble Baroness makes an important point but, in the context of this, I think her first point was even more relevant. Perhaps at a later stage, more than six months would be appropriate; maybe a year would be appropriate. Either way, it is appropriate that Parliament has a look at the costs of implementation, not least because there will be views among parliamentarians about where that burden should fall, and whether it should fall on some of the EFL clubs that might find it difficult to afford those costs of following this legislation. It is interesting that the French regulator who covers professional football confirmed yesterday that he has five staff to do the job that we are looking to cover with this substantial regulation. He also has 18 volunteers from the leagues, including the French FA, who make up their boards and committees to do the work that we have been considering so far in Committee. The reason for moving this amendment is the concern about the uncertainty of the additional costs to be imposed on all 116 clubs as a result of the financial regulations set out in this Bill. I am not going to go into the details of questioning each and every figure, because that would be inappropriate, but I think it is worth looking at areas of the impact assessment that lead me to worry about the potential increase in costs that this could result in, not least because there is no estimate of litigation costs involved with the regulator, and we have heard that there is quite a lot of potential litigation that could be flowing as a result of the role of the regulator. Initially, these litigation costs in the Bill will be funded through fines and interest as a first recourse, and that is set out Clause 96; but the further costs to cover litigation would come via the levy—in other words, come via the clubs themselves, and not be a burden on the taxpayer. That could lead to perverse incentives when it comes to the advocacy-first proportionate enforcement model. The legal costs should not be underestimated when you bear in mind that in the last financial year the Premier League had some £40 million-worth of legal costs alone. We should add to that the potential for legal costs associated with what we have been discussing this evening. I hope they do not come to fruition, but it is perfectly possible that they might, with parachute payments and the backstop. In the context of trying to establish a cost base for clubs and the government regulator, it is really important that we look in detail at the impact assessment. It addresses costs in three buckets: familiarisation costs of £400,000 to £1.2 million, covering the one-off costs to business occurring in the first year of the appraisal period; compliance costs, which potentially go up to £35.8 million over the 10-year appraisal, which are the ongoing costs to business following the first year of the appraisal period; and then the operational costs, which are significantly higher. While these operational costs will initially be funded by the Exchequer before an industry levy is introduced, the costs will subsequently be clawed back from all clubs. The role of the regulator and the work required by clubs is based on the belief that professional football in this country is in crisis and requires government intervention to sort it out. The legislation addresses what it has set out to be perverse incentives and misaligned owner motivations which have resulted in excessive risk taking in pursuit of sporting success and promotion. Those are quotes and they are meat to any lawyer immediately before this Bill is even on the statute book. Ultimately, the Government argue that this has resulted in market failure, despite the Premier League being the most successful football league in the world and the Championship the sixth-richest in Europe. However, the Government have ignored that and believe, as is clearly set out in the impact assessment, that government intervention is necessary to correct market failure. There are complete sections on the problems that the Government believe have led to this market failure. Briefly, in 1.2.1 on page 9, the Government believe there is a perverse incentive for clubs to overreach financially. I anticipate that will be challenged. Paragraph 1.2.2 states that inequitable distribution across the English football pyramid has exacerbated poor financial and operational management. Paragraph 1.2.3 states that unsustainable financial management exists, in the view of the Government. Paragraph 1.2.4 covers poor operational management where financial mismanagement has been exacerbated by poor-quality operational management and decision-making at clubs. That is quite a statement to address towards professional football clubs in this country. Paragraph 1.2.5 states that clubs will need to spend more to “take into account the interests of fans/communities”, which currently they do not sufficiently consider. But the impact assessment does not set out how much this is, or make costs, or rectify any of the other broken aspects of professional football that I have outlined this evening. It argues that the existing regulations have “proved ineffective” and it states that the “free market will not rectify the football industry’s problems”. In paragraphs 1.3.2 and 1.3.5, it says that “market failure has large spillover impacts on society”, which it does not cost. In paragraph 1.7.5, the FA is blamed, with the Government concluding that, “given the inaction of the leagues and the FA, the preferred option is to establish a new statutory independent regulator rather than industry self regulation or a light touch intervention”. That is somewhat at odds with what the Minister was saying, because she argued quite strongly that light-touch regulation was what was sought—but in the impact assessment it is made clear that the Government favours having an independent regulator rather than “industry self regulation or a light touch intervention”. If it is not to be light-touch intervention and it is to be heavy intervention, that will incur significant costs, and it is not clear at all what those costs will be. This is important, because the Government are rejecting in this document light-touch intervention on the French model for comprehensive state-controlled regulation, which will cost all clubs substantial internal costs and legal costs, potentially with the cost of lawyers and outside advisers for sure, to comply with the tasks outlined in the Bill, since all clubs will need to be licensed and meet in detail all the requirements in this lengthy and comprehensive legislation. To believe that this can be done for £40 million a year under preferred option 4 over the coming 10 years is, to be quite honest, fanciful. It ignores the legal costs and the club operating and compliance costs for all 116 clubs, and it ignores potential litigation costs. It beggars belief to believe that the total central estimate for familiarisation to the clubs and leagues associated with option 4 is £800,000, or £7,000 a club on average. The compliance costs outlined in paragraph 211 are estimated at £100,000 per annum for Premier League clubs and £60,000 for all remaining clubs. I do not see for the life of me how that is possible. However, at least the Government have added the rider that familiarisation compliance costs “may be underestimated” and that “this is a novel and high profile area”. It certainly is that. So, the Government suggest, “clubs may pay more attention and buy in high-end specialist advice”. But high-end specialist advice does not come for £7,000 a club per annum. However, all this is predicated on the most important paragraph, paragraph 289, towards the conclusion of the impact assessment, which states: “The Regulator will be legally prohibited from intervening in football (e.g. spend on players) or commercial (e.g. ticket price) activities, thus limiting the potential risk of deterring investment”. We have spent dozens of hours looking into the fact that there will be detailed and intrusive activities by the regulator—understandably, to fulfil the legal requirements of this Bill. Far from not being interventionist in football, the regulator will in fact be legally required to intervene in the running of all aspects of the financing of football, including external factors such as season ticket prices and other ticket prices, in its overview of the finances of all clubs. There is nothing on the finances of the clubs in this legislation that is exempt from the consideration of the regulator, if he or she should wish to look at that in the context of fulfilling their functions under the legislation. What it should say, as I say, is that the regulator is legally required to intervene in the running of all aspects of football—and, if that is the case, there is a whole different scenario for the costs involved for all clubs. I am not talking about just Premier League clubs or EFL clubs—I am talking about all clubs. That is why I would hope that there would be an opportunity to review the costs at six months—or it could be year—because this is the first time this has ever occurred in sport in this country. It is indeed the first time that it has ever occurred in football in the European Union, or indeed in any international body that I know of. The statement that I have just made underpins the whole cost structure and sits uncomfortably with paragraph 298 of the impact assessment, which provides for the regulator to enter business premises in conjunction with an investigation or an actual or suspected breach of a club’s licence conditions in any form with its powers of search and seizure and the power to require specified persons to attend an interview. Given the likely cost of this intrusive legislation, I believe it is important to write into the Bill a review of the financial impact on regulated clubs of complying with its provisions, so that football fans can regularly review the true costs of government-led regulation. I beg to move.