Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)

My Lords, I will focus my remarks on Amendment 462B, in my name, and support Amendments 463, 464 and 465, to which I have attached my name. Like my noble friend Lord Murray of Blidworth, this is the first opportunity I have had to contribute to this Committee’s deliberations and, like him, I last spoke on Second Reading. The amendment requires a public notice to be issued 28 days before the panel intends to sit, which would enable members of the public to attend and potentially engage with the proceedings. I want to say in advance that this a probing amendment. I understand further work would need to be done, probably through regulations, to specify what any notice must entail and consider any further matters around privacy. I am open as to whether 28 days is the right notice period. Amendment 439, in the name of my noble friend Lady Maclean of Redditch, does a good job of addressing many of these concerns, in a way that aligns closely with existing practice directions in the Court of Protection. However, those caveats aside, I trust that this amendment probes an important point. Schedule 2.6 states that: “Panels are to determine referrals in public”, but the public nature of the panel is surely illusory if interested parties are not notified that a panel hearing is taking place. How would anyone know when and where to turn up? I do not think we can gloss over this as a minor omission. Giving evidence to the House’s Select Committee, at page 143 the Law Society listed this issue among the things it is “really concerned about”. As it explains, it is unclear at the moment where the panels will be held and how people will know about them. That needs to be clarified and further information needs to be provided. The point was also well made by the late Sir James Munby, the former president of the Family Division, whose comments continue to have an important influence on our deliberations. He described the Bill’s silence on a notification mechanism as “an astonishing omission”. He went on: “Quite apart from all the other reasons why it might be thought desirable to make such provision in the Bill, the participation of others is necessary if the process is to have that degree of rigour which is essential if it is to be capable of identifying and preventing possible abuses, and in particular be adequate to detect what may be very subtle external pressures, and if it is to command public confidence”. He was absolutely right. Supporters of the Bill have talked about how they intend this proposed law to bring end-of-life decisions “out of the shadows”. However, as drafted, the Bill provides for individuals to die in secrecy with the intentional assistance of the state. We cannot ignore the impact that this secrecy will have on the grief of families who hear that their loved one has died by assisted suicide only after the event, particularly if they possess relevant facts such as evidence of coercion or mental illness. The Committee may be aware of the tragic death last year of Maureen Slough from Cavan, Ireland. Her family reported their devastation at being informed of their mother’s assisted suicide via a WhatsApp message from a Swiss clinic. The same message also informed them that her ashes would arrive by post. The circumstances behind Ms Slough’s death were even more tragic. First, her brother, a UK solicitor, said Maureen had provided the clinic with “letters of complaint to medical authorities in Ireland in respect of bogus medical conditions” which the clinic allegedly used to support her application. Secondly, the clinic claimed to have received what appears to have been a forged letter from her daughter Megan, acknowledging her mother’s plans. These details, together with the fact that Ms Slough had long struggled with mental illness, suggest that there were potential red flags which may have been identified had the family been duly notified. While supporters of the Bill may argue that the panel process is designed precisely to avert this kind of situation, I respectfully ask how we can be so sure. Remember that the panel operates on only a civil level of proof—in other words, on probability. To use an example from Ms Slough’s story, it is likely that the panel would have concluded, without hearing Megan’s claim that she did not write it, that the letter was more likely to be a forgery and so warrant further investigation. Perhaps so, but we cannot be sure and that is the problem. We must also consider the importance of notification in light of the Bill providing no clear mechanism for families to intervene at a later stage once an eligibility certificate has been granted. To refer again to the late Sir James Munby, in his very eloquent words, “the Amended Bill is entirely silent as to how the panel is to deal with the kind of issue exemplified by the Canadian case of AY v NB … where the patient’s partner intervened and obtained an interim injunction because of concerns about what was happening. What if the patient’s partner and relatives, excluded from participation in the panel process, discover, only after the panel has granted a certificate … facts of the kind which in AY v NB prompted an eleventh-hour intervention by the Canadian judge?” This is a major hole in the Bill and, as it stands, if interested parties are to intervene, it must be at the panel stage and they must be informed of the panel meeting so that they can apply to submit evidence as necessary. Finally, I want to address concerns that some noble Lords may have around the amendment’s requirement to publish the names of people referred to the panel and the potential impact this may have on privacy. I have thought long and hard about this. As I alluded to before, there is great merit in the proposal by my noble friend Lady Maclean in Amendment 439. However, one weakness is that it requires the commissioner to notify any other person properly interested in the welfare of the person. There is no clear way of establishing who they might be. How is the commissioner to know which friends to contact? One may just have vital information. Therefore, there is a benefit in requiring a more general notice. I also observe that there are times where public interest is so great that it outweighs privacy concerns. Marriage, as a public institution, is a good example of this. I based the amendment on its notification requirements. In that context, the interest that we all have in defending that public institution means that a general notice is issued so that anyone can come forward with evidence of coercion or any other legal impediment. In considering public interest, we need to appreciate what is going on here. In the words of my noble friend Lady May of Maidenhead at Second Reading, this Bill gives the state a licence to kill. Whatever our views on the subject, in handing the state this power there is surely great public interest in demanding maximum oversight and safeguards. The panel process should not be seen as totally analogous to the situation in the Court of Protection, where greater anonymity protections would normally apply. It is important to note that most cases in the Court of Protection involve patients who clearly lack capacity and have not consented to the process. Instead, cases usually involve best interest disputes between families and medics. However, in this process it is a basic requirement that the patient be able to consent. In closing, I add this. Even if the House desires a more anonymised process, we need to debate the details of it. What restrictions would there be on media reporting? Who would determine the circumstances in which these restrictions apply? Perhaps the noble and learned Lord, the sponsor, can address these issues in his remarks. Without answers to these and other questions, the Bill risks the assisted suicide process being more shadowy and less transparent than would apply in cases in the Court of Protection. I do not think that this is acceptable.