Lord Mann (Lab)

My Lords, I again refer noble Lords to my interests in the register relating to this debate. I was in a meeting with the chair of the supervisory board of one of the more successful German football clubs discussing regulation. I asked him if there was one thing that could be done to improve football from regulation inside England what it would be. His advice was that the best thing that could be done—which is not actually available to us in this House as an amendment—would be to tax football agents in the UK through the British tax system. Why might the head of a major football club—a competitor—wish to see that happen? If that happened—or if anything else threw into question the transparency of football finances, particularly in relation to the acquisition and departure of the key asset players—behaviour would be modified. I recall discussions with people who gave graphic detail of how, in the olden days—but not old enough for me not to have seen it happen—there was the notion of “cash in the boot”. A player would be signed to a team, suddenly and unexpectedly, and would play a few games. In doing so, cash would be handed over. I do not think that; I know that. I will not cite examples even though I could—it would not be fair to do so—but that was not uncommon. In the modern game—today’s game—the amounts of money are much greater. One has seen situations where football clubs get into financial problems, usually because of relegation from the Premier League, and do not seem to know who owns their assets. There is a myriad of situations. That includes contract details—I can think of some in the recent past, where the fans, sponsors and others were rather bemused to find that certain players were able to go, at no fee, to play for other teams because of a clause in the contract that most people were unaware of. My Amendments 129 and 248 seek to deal with the specific problem of how agents behave. There are examples I could cite where, pre transfer, players have been sold or bought for significant amounts of money and, literally at the very last moment, they suddenly change agents. I will give a hypothetical example, rather than shine too much specific light. Let us say that a player is sold for many tens of millions, and they have a single agent. The day before their transfer documents are signed, they then change agency. The agent then sues the player for their loss—for the cut that they would have got—even though the agents’ fees are very significantly higher than the worth of the individual agent. Why would anyone choose to do that? If you are a purchasing club and you are competing with others for a prized asset, you might well be prepared to pay more money and whatever requirements there are. But why would a selling club do that? What would the advantage be? The answer is there is zero advantage to a selling club—none—or, potentially, a disadvantage. If there are £15 million or £20 million in agents’ fees, that amount of money might come in to your club. So what is the motivation? One of the things that has bedevilled football across the world, not just English football, has been people taking a percentage. I have spoken to people who have been offered money to give statistics on 12 and 13 year-olds in their own club—a cash-based suggestion that would accumulate over time, should the player get to a level of being worth lots of money. That is the minutia, but the major cases will involve major financial transactions. Fans are often perplexed by certain purchases and the amounts of money spent on players. They say, “What is going on here? This player does not appear to be worth quite that amount of money, or indeed anything near it. It must be because of bad football decisions”. I put it to the Committee that perhaps the transactions are determined not always by football decisions but by loans. Most fans can cite times they have been bemused when their club has loaned a player in and paid a very large amount of money to do so, even though no one has ever heard of them before. The player then disappears a year on, and no one ever hears of them again. Why would you pay £1 million or £2 million to loan a player who no one has heard of, who has no track record and who then has no future track record? The taxman has an interest, which is why, if I were able to do so and it would have been within the rules of this Committee, I would have proposed that taxing agents via the UK tax system would be the best answer. While that does not give public transparency, it seems that it would mediate behaviour. However, these two amendments seek to allow the regulator—not the general public—to be able to see and assess what is being paid and what is in the contracts. That would not be in a public way, but in a private way—and that would modify such behaviour. If we are interested in competition in the sport, taking out externalities that have nothing to do with the business of the sport is in the interests—including the business interests—of the industry and the sport. Shining a light so that people do not feel it would be appropriate to do their decision-making based on how much they receive as a reward for their wisdom in, say, selling a player would be to the health of the game. Anyone in the Committee who thinks that does not happen, and has not happened, is being extremely naive. Anyone who thinks that this happens only at the lower end—the non-league, with a bit of cash in a back pocket—is also being naive. Because of the way the football business has worked, there is a lot of money to be made, and people have managed to find ways—legally—of making additional profits for themselves, particularly out of the movement of the key asset players. These two amendments seek to allow at least the regulator to see exactly what is going on. Indeed, this is important in the critical situation where, say, a club does not own the assets that everyone thinks it has, because it has managed to sell them off in advance to some third party and therefore cannot cash in on them. There are examples that I am very familiar with, where clubs have gone insolvent because of that. In some way, this power needs to be in the Bill, unless the Government could be persuaded that HMRC would be a better decision-making body and have all football agents’ transactions in this country taxed through the UK tax system. I beg to move.