Baroness Brady (Con)

My Lords, I refer the Committee to my interests declared in the register. I support Amendment 71 tabled by my noble friend Lord Markham, which raises a crucial point regarding the backstop mechanism. We must be clear at the outset about what this mechanism governs and, critically, what it does not. First, it is vital to understand that the backstop is categorically not about the fair apportionment of collective football revenues. Each party—the Premier League and the EFL—has its own central broadcast revenues. Indeed, the EFL has just secured a landmark five-year domestic broadcasting deal worth nearly £1 billion, increasing its central revenues by 50% from next season. This is testament to the Championship’s growing competitiveness and appeal. I will not dwell on the fact that many of its recipients are incredibly wealthy—I believe there are nine billionaire owners in the Championship, along with many other extremely well-funded ownership groups—but I will dwell on the fact that, despite its very healthy income, the EFL does not give any money to the National League. It gives no funding to the leagues directly below it. It is the Premier League that supports the National League. Far from some sort of neutral arbitration to allow all parties to share with each other, the backstop is in fact a mechanism for the forcible redirection of billions of pounds of Premier League revenue only. In other words, this is one set of private businesses handing over money to another competing set, even if they do not want to give more than the £1.6 billion they already do and it damages their ability to compete. The critical point, therefore, is that this backstop mechanism represents a completely unprecedented and untested intervention in what are the private commercial rights of Premier League clubs only. It impacts uniquely on Premier League clubs. The gravity and novelty of such an intervention demands the most careful consideration. Crucially, the backstop introduces a major and radical change in the Bill: the inclusion of parachute payments. This decision was taken without adequate consultation with Premier League clubs. I mentioned earlier in Committee that just seven out of 20 clubs were invited to a 30-minute meeting on the Bill with the Secretary of State between the Government taking office in July and the decision, which was taken in October. It is no surprise that this lack of consultation has produced such a reckless decision. There simply cannot have been an appropriate understanding by the Government of its potential consequences. Parachute payments are not a financial convenience; they are a cornerstone of the Premier League’s competitive balance. Without them, clubs cannot plan for long-term investment, or the stability required to maintain the intense competitiveness that is the hallmark of the Premier League and a significant driver of its global appeal. Parachutes are also—this is an often-overlooked point—a key part of the financial incentives for Championship clubs to invest in that league, knowing that if they reach the promised land, it will not all be undone with one bad year. To fundamentally alter this system risks undermining the very factors that have made the Premier League such a global success and one of the UK’s greatest soft power assets. Potentially harming the magic ingredient of the Premier League’s competitive balance threatens to destabilise long-term commitments, jeopardising investment in lower-league stadiums, academies and community programmes. I believe it would fundamentally undermine the Championship, too. We should also consider the concerns raised by UEFA. It has warned that the backstop mechanism could disrupt the balance of power in football governance and negatively affect the competitive equilibrium in both domestic and European competitions. UEFA has urged the Government to carefully reconsider their approach, emphasising that mandating redistribution in this way risks deterring amicable solutions and the very investments that underpin the success of English football. This unprecedented intervention into private commercial rights must be carefully scrutinised. It very obviously has a differential and disproportionate impact on the clubs within the Premier League. It is also clear that the consequences of this seismic and deeply flawed intervention have not been fully understood. We do, as UEFA has said, need to reconsider this critical issue.