Contribution
I thank the noble Lords, Lord Clement-Jones and Lord Markham, the noble Viscount, Lord Colville, and the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, for raising these topics around digital verification services. As I explained at Second Reading, these digital verification services already exist. They are already out there making all sorts of claims for themselves. With the new trust framework, we are trying to provide some more statutory regulation of the way that they operate. It is important that we have this debate and that we get it right, but some of the things we are doing are still work in progress, which is why we do not always have all the detailed answers that noble Lords are searching for here and why some powers have been left to the Secretary of State.
I shall go from the top through the points that have been raised. Amendments 33 and 43, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, and Amendment 40 tabled by the noble Viscount, Lord Colville, would require the trust framework to include rules on monitoring compliance and redress mechanisms and would require the Secretary of State to ensure the independence of accredited conformity assessment bodies. The noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, asked questions akin to those regarding redress for the vulnerable, and I will write to her setting out a response to that in more detail.
On the issue of redress mechanisms in the round, the scope of the trust framework document is solely focused on the rules that providers of digital verification services are required to follow. It does not include matters of governance. Compliance is ensured via a robust certification process where services are assessed against the trust framework rules. They are assessed by independent conformity assessment bodies accredited by the United Kingdom Accreditation Service, so some oversight is already being built into this model.
The Bill contains powers for the Secretary of State to refuse applications to the DVS register or to remove providers where he is satisfied that the provider has failed to comply with the trust framework or if he considers it necessary in the interests of national security. These powers are intended as a safety net, for example, to account for situations where the Secretary of State might have access to intelligence sources that independent conformity assessment bodies cannot assess and therefore will not be able to react to, or it could be that a particular failure of the security of one of these trust marks comes to light very quickly, and we want to act very quickly against it. That is why the Secretary of State has those powers to be able to react quickly in what might be a national security situation or some other potential leak of important data and so on.
In addition, conformity assessment bodies carry out annual surveillance audits and can choose to conduct spot audits on certified providers, and they have the power to withdraw certification where non-conformities are found. Adding rules on compliance would cut across that independent certification process and would be outside the scope of the trust framework. Those independent certification processes already exist.
Amendments 33, 41, 42, 44 and 45 tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, would in effect require the creation of an independent appeals body to adjudicate on the refusal of an application to the DVS register and the implementation of an investigatory process applicable to refusal and removal from the DVS register. The powers of the Secretary of State in this regard are not without safeguards. They may be exercised only in limited circumstances after the completion of an investigatory process and are subject to public law principles, for example, reasonableness. They may also be challenged by judicial review.
To go back to the point I was making, it might be something where we would need to move quickly. Rather than having a convoluted appeals process in the way that the noble Lord was talking about, I hope he understands the need sometimes for that flexibility. The creation and funding of an independent body to adjudicate such a limited power would therefore be inappropriate.