Andy Slaughter

It is a pleasure to follow the excellent speech of the right hon. Member for Sutton Coldfield (Mr Mitchell). In preparation for today I have had a number of discussions with my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley (Kim Leadbeater), and I want to put on record that the measured way she has dealt with the proceedings has been excellent. I do not know whether she has ever had moments of doubting whether this was the right thing to pick as a private Member’s Bill, but she has been an absolute credit to this House in the way she has dealt with these matters so far. In 2015, in the last Chamber debate on this subject, I wound up for the Opposition Front Bench, but my interest in it goes back much further. Like all Members of this House, I have had hundreds of emails from constituents on both sides of the argument. Many ask me to oppose the Bill; those emails come from people of faith, and I wholly and entirely respect what they say, but they are the first people also to say that this is an individual decision for every individual Member of the House to make. As I have been at the bottom of the list of speakers to be called for so many years, I have great sympathy for those who find themselves there today, so I will try to keep my remarks to one narrow point: the legal context of the Bill. There is a false dichotomy that the law as it stands is fit for purpose, that we go into the unknown with the Bill before us and that we should somehow keep the safety of the status quo. I think that could not be more wrong. There are no safeguards in the current law. The only sanction against coercion is ex post facto; we are leaving it to individual directors of public prosecutions to make decisions in individual cases after the event. DPPs take that job extremely seriously, as anyone knows who has heard Sir Max Hill, the last DPP to speak on the subject. They have, at the instigation of the courts, set out guidelines—I think we know that it was an excellent Director of Public Prosecutions who set out the guidelines on this case. They have done everything they can, but it is not their responsibility; it is our responsibility, and the courts, up to and including the Supreme Court, have made that clear. We assign in this Bill a role to the High Court as part of the process, but we are the final decision takers. That has been made clear not only by domestic, but by international courts; the European Court of Human Rights has said in every case in which such matters have come before it that the margin of appreciation should be put into effect and therefore it should not interfere with the law as we decide it. We cannot dodge our responsibilities and I know that we do not want to do that. We have a duty to put in place the best law we can, and that is not the law as it stands. There are three choices for people who want to end their own lives. They can go to Dignitas alone, if they can afford to do that. They can attempt, and perhaps succeed in, suicide. They risk failing. If they succeed, they will have a lonely death. They may, as others have pointed out, simply have to resort to refusing treatment or food. The third option is that they can embroil their relatives or friends, at the risk of their being investigated or prosecuted. They also risk ending their lives too soon. On safeguards, I do not follow the view of opponents of the Bill. At some times they seem to say that they are too complex, too expensive and that there are not enough resources. If we want to resource the Bill, we can. I do not think that those are the strongest arguments.