Dr Ben Spencer

Prior to my election to Parliament, as a consultant psychiatrist with a PhD in decision-making capacity, I would have met both criteria to be a medical expert assessor under clause 9(3)(b), so I have a particular perspective as someone who, in different circumstances, might have been called upon to make these assessments. I strongly believe that we should respect and support the right to bodily autonomy for people with full decision-making capacity, subject to the caveat that it does not cause serious harm to others. I argued for this when I was on the working group of the independent review of the Mental Health Act 1983 and on the pre-legislative scrutiny Committee on the Mental Health Bill, which, among other things, aims to prevent people from coming to harm when suffering from severe mental illness. These reforms were debated in the House of Lords this week, and they demonstrate how Parliament should legislate in complex areas that balance individual autonomy and risk. In contrast, as a private Member’s Bill, there is limited ability for scrutinising this Bill’s provisions. It has had no independent review, no pre-legislative scrutiny and no impact assessments. Many MPs support the principle of assisted dying yet have concerns about implementation, resource implications and safeguarding. That is why I, along with colleagues on both sides of the House, tabled a reasoned amendment calling for an independent review and consultation before a vote in Parliament, to provide a third way through. I thank the Members who supported the amendment, particularly the hon. Members for Shipley (Anna Dixon) and for Twickenham (Munira Wilson), for their work and their extensive and careful consideration. Although the general debate on assisted dying may focus largely on the principles, legislation must address the limits to and the safeguards on consent. Should people be able to agree to a medically assisted death? If so, what restrictions, if any, should there be on people who can make this decision—age, capacity, terminal illness, intolerable suffering? And then, what safeguards are there to uphold these limits and to prevent abuse—assessments by two doctors, judicial scrutiny? Given that the main argument I see in favour of assisted dying is the exercise of personal autonomy, I believe the most substantive issues we need to wrestle with are the limits that we set. Why is this Bill limited to the terminally ill and not those who are suffering without that being terminal? What even comes within the scope of terminal illness? With the refusal of treatment and medication, conditions such as type 1 diabetes and HIV can be designated as terminal, despite being fully treatable. There are many questions, but in this Bill the most prominent problem is that, in a legal context, if the availability of assisted dying is limited only to those who are terminally ill, it is discriminatory either to those with or without terminal illness. Either their right to autonomy is greater than others’, or the value of their life is worth less. We must also ask whether autonomy can be exercised where there is no choice. If good palliative care is simply not available, can we really rely on this as a true and free decision? I would argue that we cannot, and that this Bill does not safeguard against coercion through state neglect.